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PROMISES, PROMISES: USING THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE TO MANAGE EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE IN ERISA LITIGATION
Alison M. Sulentict
On September 2, 1974, President Gerald Ford signed a bill that would
have a profound impact on the administration and enforcement of
employer-provided health insurance plans. As President Ford heralded "a
brighter future for almost all the men and women of our labor force," the
country celebrated the first major attempt to "bring some order and
humanity" into the private pension system.1 Curiously, neither the title of
the new law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), nor President Ford's remarks on that day hinted at the
consequences of this legislation for the millions of Americans whose health
insurance depended on their employers.
Twenty-six years later, President Ford's optimistic introduction of
ERISA is more striking for what he did not say: nowhere did the President
promise a brighter future for participants in employer-sponsored health
insurance plans. In retrospect, perhaps that was wise, for the legacy of
ERISA's first quarter century would have proved such optimism false.
Through ERISA, Congress promised "to protect.., the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." 2 Yet in the
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I. Gerald R. Ford, Statement on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (Sept. 2, 1974) in PuB. PAPERs 46-47 (1975). See Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1976) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
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words of one judge who recently struggled with the statute's almost
intractable influence on health insurance plans, ERISA must now be
regarded as "a statute that, due to the changing realities of the modem
health care system, has gone conspicuously awry from its original intent.
Does anyone care? Do you?
3
As ERISA celebrates its twenty-sixth anniversary and we mark its
impact on employment-based health insurance, surely we must answer
"yes." The majority of United States citizens now receive health insurance
as part of their employment.4 In many cases, the promise of medical
coverage extends through retirement.5 The promise of health insurance
benefits may serve as the basis for an employee's personal and professional
decisions.6 For this reason, it is all the more important that the employee
3. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 68-69 (D. Mass. 1997).
4. See PAUL FRONSTIN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EMPLOYMENT-
BASED HEALTH BENEFITS: WHO IS OFFERED COVERAGE VS. WHO TAKES IT 4 (1999)
[hereinafter WHO IS OFFERED COVERAGE]; PAUL FRONSTIN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED:
ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1999 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 3 (1999) [hereinafter 1999
POPULATION SURVEY]; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
1998 1-2 (Oct. 1999), available at <www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-208.pdf> (visited
Oct. 4, 1999) [hereinafter HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1998]. See generally JOHN B.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 178-181 (3d ed.
2000); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE - MEDIUM AND
LARGE EMPLOYERS CAN PURCHASE COVERAGE, BUT SOME WORKERS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE,
GAO REP. 98-184 (1998) available at <www.gao.gov> (visited June 8, 2000) [hereinafter
GAO REP. 98-184] (stating facts related to private employers and health care); Marsha
Gold, The Changing US Health Care System: Challenges for Responsible Public Policy, 77
MILBANK Q. 3, 5-6 (1999) (arguing that private sector employers play a substantial role in
US healthcare).
5. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REIREE HEALTH INSURANCE, EROSION IN
EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS FOR EARLY RETIREES, GAO REP. 97-150, 4-5 (1997)
(describing background information regarding the provision of retiree benefits in the United
States) available at <www.gao.gov> (visited June 5, 2000) [hereinafter GAO REP. 97-150];
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, DECLINING EMPLOYER COVERAGE
MAY AFFECT ACCESS FOR 55 TO 64 YEAR OLDS, GAO REP. 98-133, 4 (1998) (noting that
'many current retirees still have access to employer-based health benefits," even though
these circumstances "may not portend well for the future") available at <vww.gao.gov>
(visited June 5, 2000) [hereinafter GAO REP. 98-133].
6. See, e.g., Dembski v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., No. 88 CV 2953, 1989 WL 15951, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (exemplifying a class action in which the parties later settled their
differences). Plaintiffs "asserted that they had worked until retirement in reliance upon the
'promise of retirement security,' and that they had further relied upon the promise of lifetime
medical coverage in deciding whether to accept early retirement." Id. In 1988, however,
the employer told early retirees that they would no longer receive free benefits. The
employer offered them a choice of either continuing the current level of coverage by paying
a monthly premium or of accepting a lower level of benefits at no cost.
For a discussion of the impact of health benefits on "job lock," see generally Thomas C.
Buchmueller & Robert G. Valletta, The Effects of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on
Worker Mobility, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 439, 453 (1996) (using data from the 1984
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understand the limitations of that promise and the possibility that these
limitations may include the employer's right to terminate or amend the
plan.7 This Article explores the circumstances of law and jurisprudence
that allow such promises to be so deftly constrained.
Federal legislation affords a participant in an employment-based
health plan little protection from the employer's ability to amend or
terminate health benefits at will. Together with the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, ERISA takes the leading role in governing employee benefit
plans.8 These statutes provide the regulatory framework under which the
nation's private employers may design and offer pension and welfare
benefits to employees. Together, they give employers the freedom to
decide most of the requirements for eligibility in an employee health plan,
as well as the type and amount of covered benefits. With few exceptions,9
Survey of Income and Program Participation and a model that incorporates variables for
individual pensions and job tenure, authors "find mixed evidence of job-lock among dual
earner married men, but stronger evidence of job-lock among dual earner married women"
and "evidence of substantial job-lock among single women, but weak evidence of job-lock
among single men and sole earner married men"); Alan C. Monheit & Philip F. Cooper,
Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory and Evidence, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 68,
82 (1994) (suggesting, using data from 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, that
"wage earners expected to lose coverage were less likely to change jobs and those expected
to gain coverage were more likely to change jobs"). For a contrary view, see generally
Kanika Kapur, The Impact of Health on Job Mobility: A Measure of Job Lock, 51 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 282, 296 (1998) (analyzing the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
and concluding that "once a consistent estimation technique is used, job lock is small and
statistically insignificant").
7. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995); Sprague v. General
Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2312 (1998); In re
Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995).
Consider the dissenting opinion in Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 146 (3d
Cir. 1993) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting):
An employer's promise to pay the cost of medical care for its employees is
illusory if an employer can unilaterally eliminate or reduce benefits. The
employer is then relieved of its promise of indemnity just when indemnity is
most needed, and the employee in need of care is deprived of part of what he
worked to get. For the employee, there is no quid pro quo. When benefits are
thus reduced or snatched away, the promises those employees thought their
employers had made to them disappear. [T]he rationale of these decisions needs
examination.
8. See generally Bradley W. Joondelph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform:
Rethinking the Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REv.
1229, 1229 (1995) (explaining how the Internal Revenue Code benefits employees by
allowing them to exclude sponsored health insurance from their gross income). See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. §§ 105, 106 (1994) (taxation of health care benefits); 26 U.S.C. § 125 (1994)
(cafeteria plans), 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1994) (qualification requirements for pension and profit-
sharing plans).
9. See, e.g., Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1994); Qualified Medical Child Support Order (QMCSO), 29 U.S.C. §
20001
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Congress has not limited this freedom by mandating substantive provisions
of health plans.10 Furthermore, freed by ERISA's powerful preemption
112clause," self-insured health plans 2 are largely exempt from state insurance
regulation. 3 With few statutory protections for participants in employer-
sponsored health insurance plans, ERISA, in many respects, has proven to
be a failure.
14
1169 (1994); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1181-82 (1994). In addition, some limited federal protections may be found in
the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2874 (1996) and the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874
(1996). Certain indirect influences on the scope of employee eligibility may be found in the
provisions relating to the deductibility of the cost of medical coverage under the Internal
Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106 (1994).
10. For a discussion of the ERISA vacuum, see Kathy L. Cerminara, Protecting
Participants in and Beneficiaries of ERISA-Governed Managed Health Care Plans, 29 U.
MEM. L. REv. 317 (1999); Alan I. Widiss & Larry Gostin, What's Wrong with the ERISA
Vacuum?: The Case Against Unrestricted Freedom for Employers to Terminate Employee
Health Care Plans and to Decide What Coverage Is to Be Provided When Risk Retention
Plans Are Established for Health Care, 41 DRAKEL. REv. 635 (1992).
11. For a discussion of the general principles at work in ERISA preemption, see Jay
Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1994); Catherine
L. Fisk, The Last Article About The Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of The
Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996); David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in
the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945 (1991); David L. Gregory, The Scope of
ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 427
(1987); Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and
Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 109 (1985); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting
Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1149 (1998);
Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA
Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996); William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman,
Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA
Section 514, 62 TaX. L. REv. 1313 (1984). For a discussion of ERISA preemption on the
regulation of employee health insurance plans, see Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy
Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 255 (1990); Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA:
Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47 (1988).
12. See generally Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under
ERISA, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 51-55 (1999) (explaining that as a result of the deemer
clause, states usually do not characterize employer funded benefit plans as insurance);
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, ERISA: A Call for Reform: Whitepaper
by ERISA Working Group, J. INS. REG. 3 (1995).
13. See Metropolitan Life v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). For a recent study of
the impact of state and federal insurance mandates on the decision of employers to self-
insure their health benefit expenditures, see GAiL A. JENSEN & MICHAEL A. MORRISEY,
HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AMERICA, MANDATED BENEFIT LAWS AND EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH INSURANCE (1999), available at <http://membership.hiaa.orglpdfs/jensenrpt.pdf>
(visited Oct. 10, 1999).
14. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 68-69 (D. Mass.
1997) ("The present gap in remedies is therefore attributable not to an overbroad application
of ERISA's preemption clause, but rather to the failure of Congress to amend ERISA's civil
PROMISES, PROMISES
In the shadow of such a legislative failure, courts have frequently
resorted to federal common law to resolve disputes over employee
benefits. 15  However, the federal common law has often proved
disappointing to employees who seek to enforce claims on the basis of
promises that were unfavorably drafted or, perhaps, never memorialized in
writing. 16 Indeed, the federal common law of ERISA has frequently placed
an unyielding emphasis on the importance of the statute's tersely stated
mandate of a written plan document. 17 In its zeal to uphold ERISA's
"emphatic preference"' 8 for written plan documents, ERISA jurisprudence
has diminished the importance of communications outside those
documents.' 9 Plan participants often have been unable to rely on such
enforcement provision to keep pace with the changing realities of the health care system.").
See generally Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA: Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled Promises, 49
ARK. L. REv. 83 (1996); Harry H. Rossbacher et al., ERISA's Dark Side: Retiree Health
Benefits, False Employer Promises and the Protective Judiciary, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 305,
307 (1997) (arguing that ERISA has affected benefit plans in a manner obverse to Congress'
intent).
15. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). The significance of the federal common
law in litigation of claims relating to health insurance cannot be underestimated. As Judge
Posner has observed:
Unfortunately ERISA, a statute primarily concerned with guaranteeing pension
benefits, has with little forethought as far as we can see taken a large class of
simple contract cases, involving claims against unfunded employer-
administered welfare plans, dumped them into federal court, and made their
resolution complicated and uncertain by subjecting them to both federal
statutory and federal common law.
Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
In recent years, many scholars have examined the role of the developing federal
common law of ERISA. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA,
21 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 541, 542 (1998) (discussing the federal courts creation of
ERISA common law including restitution and the right of contribution from joint
tortfeasors); Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.
575, 576 (1992) (describing how federal courts are primarily responsible for developing
common law); Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire
Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 153, 155
(1995); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
hterpretation., 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 959 (1995) (critiquing the federal courts for
misinterpreting the legislative intent behind ERISA).
16. But see Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting the trend
toward allowing estoppel in determining whether employees receive benefits). See, e.g.,
Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992); Lister v.
Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1989); Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872
(8th Cir. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989).
18. Id.
19. The Supreme Court's opinion in Varity v. Howe suggests the emerging concern with
communications between a fiduciary and a plan participant. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 510 (1996) (discussing liability for a breach of fiduciary duty).
2000]
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evidence to support theories of promissory or equitable estoppel that might
overcome the judiciary's requirement of written plan documents. 0 They
have been even less effective in combating the common belief that the
statutory requirement of a written plan document holds sway in ERISA
litigation as would a more conventionally worded statute of frauds.2' In an
impassioned critique of judicial interpretations of ERISA, one federal judge
has argued that
[w]hen an analysis is made of present controlling case law under
ERISA in the field of health insurance, it seems that when most
major provisions or terms have had to be interpreted, an
interpretation has prevailed that provided less protection to
"employees and their beneficiaries" than they had before ERISA
22was adopted.
In general, the federal common law of ERISA has been of little
assistance to plaintiffs whose arguments are primarily based on
extracontractual representations of benefits.
One specific way in which the focus on a written plan limits an
employee's ability to challenge employers who break informal promises is
by restricting the use of extrinsic or parol evidence to cases where the court
20. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1991)
(refusing to apply equitable estoppel to ERISA claims); Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
851 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1988); Northwest Administrators, Inc. v. B.V. & B.R.
Inc., 813 F.2d 223, 226-27 (9th Cir. 1987); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (determining ERISA's requirement of a written plan and formal amendment
procedures precludes oral modifications of plans and estoppel theories cannot be used to
alter this result). In some circuits, plaintiffs have had limited success when the oral
assertion relates to an interpretation rather than a modification of a contract. See generally
Richard P. Carr & Christine L. Thierfelder, Talk is Cheap: Oral Misrepresentations as a
Basis for Recovery from Employee Benefit Plans, 3 BENEFiTS L.J. 199, 199 (1990)
(explaining that estoppel claims are preempted by ERISA); Kimberly A. Kralowec,
Comment, Estoppel Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit Plans, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
487 (1992); Loretta Rhodes Richard, Note, ERISA: Enforcing Oral Promises to Pay
Employee Benefits, 28 B.C. L. REv. 723 (1987). See, e.g., Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d
1283, 1285-86 (1lth Cir. 1990). For a discussion of promissory estoppel in general, see
Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36
VAND. L. REv. 1383 (1983) [hereinafter Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule]; Michael B.
Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44
Sw. L.J. 841 (1990).
21. See, e.g., Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The
policy behind the 'written instrument' clause in ERISA is to prevent collusive or fraudulent
side agreements between employers and employees."). See generally Conison, supra note
15, at 634; Richard, supra note 20, at 733; Roger C. Siske & Joni L. Andrioff, Selected
Topics in ERISA Preemption, C758 ALI-ABA 45, 66-67 (1992) (emphasizing the fact that
some courts allow statute of frauds or breach of contract claims).
22. Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1355 (S.D. Miss. 1994). See
also Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Andrews-Clarke,
984 F. Supp. at 68-69.
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has determined that the plan document is ambiguous. 3 Extrinsic evidence
is rarely considered for the purpose of determining whether the plan
document in fact correctly represents the terms of any promises made prior
to execution or, in other words, whether the plan document was fully
integrated.24 Moreover, extrinsic evidence is seldom used to determine
whether an ambiguity exists in a plan document that appears on its face to
be plain? The practical effect of this omission seems clear. Simply put, if
extrinsic evidence is excluded at these crucial points in the analysis, then an
employee can do little to combat an artfully worded plan document,
regardless of whether that plan document accurately states the terms of the
plan.
In this article, I suggest that the parol evidence rule offers a useful
means of determining the nature and terms of an employee benefit plan.
26
The parol evidence rule has long guided judges in determining whether a
written document contains the final expression of the parties' understanding
of the terms of their agreement and the role that other evidence should play
in the analysis of that agreement. Similarly, in the most traditional contract
dispute, such allegations pit the written document against written or oral
extrinsic evidence of extracontractual promises. The parol evidence rule
23. See, e.g., Priority Solutions, Inc. v. CIGNA, No. 98 CIV. 4336 MBM, 1999 WL
1057202 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999).
24. An interesting explanation of this problem is suggested in dicta in In Re New Valley
Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that top hat plans not subject to writing
requirement of ERISA), in which the requirement of a written plan document is likened to
"a strong integration clause, statutorily inserted in every plan document covered by the
fiduciary duty provisions."
25. See, e.g., Priority Solutions, Inc., 1999 WL 1057202, at *2.
26. For analysis of the parol evidence rule in ERISA litigation, see generally Fisk,
supra note 15, at 205-209. Professor Fisk has examined the parol evidence rule in her
article on the use of formalism in employee benefits litigation. I agree with much of
Professor Fisk's analysis of the "mechanical formalism" that has marked ERISA
jurisprudence. Her suggestions of the "alternative discourses" that should arise regarding
contra proferentum, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment offer
much to a court interested in pursuing justice while dealing with ERISA litigation. See id. at
210-16.
In this Article, I hope to offer a doctrinal analysis that will demonstrate that even
taking into account some of the fundamental critiques offered by the legal realist moment,
the parol evidence rule could be a beneficial means of righting some of the wrongs that have
been done in the name of ERISA. See generally William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging
Tenmination or Modification of Retiree Welfare Benefits: A Plaintiffs Perspective, 10 LAn.
LAW. 91, 107 (1994) (discussing which types of extrinsic evidence are relevant in ERISA
claims); Steven J. Sacher & William Payne, Sixth Circuit Holds That a Reservation of
Rights in the Plan and Some of the SPDs Trumps A Lifetime Statement in SPDs, 14 LAB.
LAw. 475, 476 (1999) (stating that if documents are ambiguous, the court should examine
extrinsic evidence); William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging Termination or Modification
of Retiree Welfare Benefits, at ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education National
Institute (October 22-23, 1998).
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thus offers useful and familiar analytical tools to judges who must balance
an employee's claim that he was promised a certain type of benefits against
an employer's interest in adhering to the terms of a written plan document.
This is precisely the inquiry that is needed in order to evaluate an
employee's claim based on promises or communications that were made
outside the language of the plan document. In the field of employee
benefits, employers normally function as plan sponsors and often act as
plan administrators and fiduciaries. 27 Such an employer holds most, if not
all, of the cards. Therefore, in judging a dispute over the promises that
have been made between employer and employee, it is imperative for the
court to examine each hand that has been played. Courts will find this a
hopeless task unless they examine whether the employee benefit plan fully
expresses the agreement between the employer and the employee. By
extension, a court should base its evaluation of an employee benefit plan on
a careful examination of the informal communications between the
employer and the employee. In other words, a court should examine
evidence that would normally be dismissed as extrinsic to a formal ERISA
plan. The parol evidence rule provides the means for doing this in a way
that effectively balances the employer's interest in preserving a written plan
document against the employee's right to present evidence of other
communications.
The deference which, by convention, is due to an employer's written
plan document has plagued ERISA plaintiffs regardless of whether their
claims deal with welfare or pension plans. For purposes of this article,
however, I have elected to focus my analysis on retiree health benefit
plans.2' Throughout the 1990s, employers struggled to come to terms not
27. See, e.g., 29 CFR § 2509.8 (1999); UAW Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co.,
188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Food Lion, 774 F. Supp. 1484 (D.S.C. 1991).
28. The issues at stake in litigation over retiree health benefits have provoked a great
deal of scholarly thought. See William R. Horbatt & Alan M. Grosman, Division of Retiree
Health Benefits on Divorce: The New Equitable Distribution Frontier, 28 FAM. L.Q. 327
(1994); Susan J. Stabile, Protecting Retiree Medical Benefits in Bankruptcy: The Scope of
Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1911, 1911 (1993) (advocating
for the protection of retiree medical benefits in bankruptcy). See generally Marilyn Ward
Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Rule
106, ERISA, and Legal Challenges to Modification and Termination of Post-retirement
Health Care Benefit Plans, 68 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 427, 428 (1994) (citing Nationale Elf
Aquitaine's termination of its medical plan as an example of how employers treat retirees);
Michael S. Melbinger & Marianne W. Culver, The Battle of the Rust Belt: Employers'
Rights to Modify the Medical Benefits of Retirees, 5 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 139, 143 (1992 -
1993) (arguing that rising costs of medical benefits have lead employers to modify or
terminate plans); Rossbacher et al., supra note 14; Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part:
Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 183, 183 (1987) (advocating amendments
to ERISA in order to protect employees); John Thacher McNeil, Note, The Failure of Free
Contract in the Context of Employer-Sponsored Retiree Welfare Benefits: Moving Toward a
Solution, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 213, 213 (1988) (discussing the failure of the legal system
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only with the rising cost of health care, but also with a change in
accounting standards that radically altered the manner in which retiree
medical benefits were funded.29 In many cases, the temptation to reduce or
eliminate retiree medical benefits proved too strong to resist. The resulting
litigation has illustrated the courts' struggle in weighing the allegations of
promises to provide a certain kind of employee benefit against plan
documents worded in more guarded terms.
Part One describes the history and structure of employee health plans
in general and retiree medical plans in particular. Part Two traces the
development of the parol evidence rule in contract law and explores the
role that Corbin and other legal scholars found proper for such evidence.
Part Three traces the principal theories of litigation in disputes over retiree
health benefits, examines the manner in which parol evidence is treated in
these cases, and suggests an application of the parol evidence rule for
future cases.
I have selected two specific applications of the parol evidence rule as
the focus of this analysis. First, the use of extrinsic evidence in
determining whether a contract is fully integrated and, second, the use of
extrinsic evidence in determining whether a contract is ambiguous.
Throughout the article, my principal concern is to bring together the
guiding policy behind ERISA, the protection of promises of employee
benefits, and the overriding purpose of the parol evidence rule-discerning
which evidence most properly illuminates the intentions of the parties to a
contract or the settlor of a trust.
to protect employees retirement health plans); Gregory J. Ossi, Comment, It Doesn't Add
Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health Benefits, Medicare and Accounting Rule FAS
106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical Coverage for Retirees, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
AND POLY. 233, 258 (1996) (advocating that employers should shoulder more retiree
expenses as our nation grows old); Tamara E. Russell, Note & Comment, Trav'lin' Light:
Early Retirees and the Availability of Post-Retirement Health Benefits, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.
537, 543 (1996) (stating that Medicare's Hospital Insurance Trust Fund will be exhausted
sometime after the turn of the century).
For a brief description of the problems facing litigation concerning retiree medical
benefits for military personnel, see generally Lieut. Col. Elling & Major Broyles, Military
Retiree Medical Care-Broken Promises or Failure to Read the Fine Print?, 1998-NOV
AiMY LAW. 62, 63 (1998) (discussing those cases); Major Mickle, Litigation Concerning
Health Care for Military Retirees, 1998-JAN ARMY LAw. 132, 132 (1998) (discussing the
effect of three federal cases on military coverage).
29. This article is not primarily concerned with the manner in which retiree medical
benefit plans are funded. However, for an interesting examination of the funding
mechanisms available see Bruce D. Pingree, Confronting Retiree Health Benefits Costs:
Current Litigation Trends, 11 TAX MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 107 (1993); Bruce D. Pingree,
Funding Retiree Welfare Benefits, 33 TAx MGMT. COMPENSATION PLANNING J. 7 (1992).
On the tax issues involved in funding employer-provided benefits for retirees, see Anne P.
Birge, Note, The Pending Crisis in Employer-Provided Health Benefits for Retirees: Are
Tax Breaksfor Employers the Ansiver?, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 797 (1992).
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I. EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS AND THE PROMISE OF
RETIREMENT COVERAGE
"How will we pay the doctor's bill?" This question, for most
Americans, is answered in part by an employer's promise to provide health
insurance benefits.30 In the past, retirees often looked to the same source to
answer this question.31 Today, the real question that retirees must ask is
whether the promise of employer-sponsored retiree medical benefits
continues to exist.
For better or worse, employers play a leading role in financing health
care for most Americans.32 When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, the
importance of employment-based health insurance was already apparent.
In the subsequent decades, participation in an employee health plan has
become the most common means of financing health care, as well as a
significant component of employee compensation. A United States
citizen's access to health insurance thus depends in large part upon his
30. 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at 3.
31. Retiree health benefits were first offered in the post World War II era, when there
were few retirees relative to the number of active workers. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: WHAT THE CHANGES MAY MEAN FOR
FUTURE BENEFITS 4 (1996).
32. The risk distribution principles that guide insurance theory are responsible for the
popularity of employment-based health insurance. The high medical costs of one employee
may be offset against the lower costs of others. Therefore, an insurer is able to prorate its
risk of loss more efficiently across a group than if it were to sell insurance individually. See
generally KEETON & WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 1.3 (1988).
The larger an employee population, the greater is the likelihood that the employer will
be able to obtain favorable insurance premium rates or absorb the costs of self-insurance.
Therefore, employees with the good fortune to obtain jobs that offer health benefits are
concentrated among large employers. This observation is supported by the data prepared
and/or analyzed by the insurance industry and by outside entities. See, e.g., CLARE LIPPERT
& ELLIOT WICKS, HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AMERICA, CRITICAL DISTINCTIONS: How FIRMS
THAT OFFER HEALTH BENEFITS DIFFER FROM THOSE THAT Do NOT 3 (1991) (observing that
the proportion of firms offering coverage increases from 27% among firms with fewer than
10 employees to 98% among firms with 100 or more employees); 1999 POPULATION
SURvEY, supra note 4, at 8.
For a general discussion of the economics of employment-based insurance, see Maria
O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classifications After McGann: Managing Risk Efficiently in
the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59, 70-72 (1995); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Some
Preliminary Thoughts on the Deregulation of Insurance to Advantage the Working Poor, 24
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 689-92 (1997). See also David Chamy, The Employee Welfare
State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1606-11 (1996) (discussing the structural
principles of health insurance plans). For a discussion of the origins of group health
insurance in the American economy, see generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
For sources that present or examine the quantitative data regarding the importance of
employer-based insurance, see supra note 4.
PROMISES, PROMISES
access to employment.33 Three in five Americans between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-four receive health coverage through their own, or a
family member's, employment.' Conversely, the ranks of the uninsured
are filled by the unemployed.
Employer-subsidized health insurance reflects and enhances personal
wealth.36 Workers who participate in employee health plans currently
33. The Employee Benefits Research Institute, a nonprofit organization that has
published annual reports on the sources of health insurance since 1988, reports that the
"most important determinant" of a person's likelihood of having health insurance is his
employment status. See 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at 8; see also HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE 1998, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that among the general population of
18-64 year olds, workers were more likely to be insured than non-workers; however,
workers who could be classified as poor were more likely to be uninsured than non-workers
because they may qualify for Medicaid).
34. The significance of employment-based coverage has remained stable throughout the
1990s, despite reductions in coverage or changes in the nature of plans. In 1993, President
Clinton reported to Congress that 59% of Americans received health insurance benefits
through their employers. See ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 126 (Jan. 1993). The
Employee Benefits Research Institute's analysis of the 1994 Current Population Survey put
the figure at 60.8% of the non-elderly population. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED:
ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1994 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 7 (1995) [hereinafter 1994
POPULATION SURVEY]. Based on a survey of the same data, the General Accounting Office
stated that the percentage of the population that received health coverage through private
and public employers is 53.9%. See U.S. GEN ACcT. OFFICE, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS, ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA GAO REP. 95-167, Appendix
III, p.4 5 (1995) available at <www.gao.gov> (visited June 5, 2000). In 1998, the Employee
Benefits Research Institute reported that 64.2% of the non-elderly population received
insurance through an employment-based plan. See 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4,
at 1.
35. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 16.3% of the United States
population, or 44.3 million people, were uninsured during 1998. The Census Bureau
reported that workers were more likely to have health insurance than non-workers were.
However, due to the influence of government programs such as Medicaid, workers who
were poor were also less likely to be insured than non-workers within the same income
range. See HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1998, supra note 4, at 1-4. Another Census
Bureau study of data from a 36-month period beginning in early 1993 noted a correlation
between unemployment and uninsured status on a short-term basis. For example, 44% of
workers who experienced a job interruption went uninsured for at least one month. The
impact of employment status on the duration of a period of the uninsurance was also
notable. Full-time workers were far less likely to go without health insurance than part-time
workers or the unemployed. When they did experience a period of non-coverage, it was
usually of a much shorter duration than that of a part-time or unemployed person. See
generally Robert L. Bennefield, Current Population Reports, U.S. Census Bureau,
Household Economic Studies, Dynamics of Economic Well-Being: Health Insurance, 1993
to 1995: Who Loses Coverage and for How Long? (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http:llwww.census.govlhhes/www/hlth9394.html> (stating the relationship between
employment status and health insurance coverage is important).
36. Recent studies by the U.S. Census Bureau found that in 1998, 8.3% of uninsured
people were in households with income of $75,000 or more, while 25.2% of people with
household incomes lower than $25,000 were uninsured. See HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
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receive a substantial portion of their compensation from employer
contributions to health insurance.37 Access to health insurance not only
provides added financial stability to workers and their families, but it also
factors into their decision to utilize health care services.38 Recent economic
analysis indicates that families who are fully or partially insured are more
likely to utilize medical services and supplies than families who are
uninsured.39
Employer-provided medical coverage also plays a significant role in
1998, supra note 4, at 5; see also 1998 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at 9, 18 (noting
that individuals with higher levels of income are more likely to be covered by private health
insurance, while those with lower levels of income are more likely to be covered by a
publicly sponsored plan).
37. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in March 1999, private industry
employers paid an average of $13.87 per hour in wages and an additional $5.13 in benefits.
Health benefit costs alone accounted on average for $1.03 per hour worked or 5.4% of total
compensation. The results of the statistical study suggest that employer spending on
benefits increases as employment status becomes more secure. Full-time workers enjoyed
higher wages and received a greater proportion of their total compensation from benefits
than part-time workers. On average, employers also paid a greater percentage of the
benefits as compensation to union employees then non-union employees. Moreover, the
average amount spent on health benefits for union workers ($2.02 per hour) was
substantially higher than that of non-union workers ($0.89). See Bureau Lab. Stat.,
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation Summary (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http:llwww.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nws.htm> [hereinafter Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation]; see also Bureau Lab. Stat., New Survey Reports on Wages and
Benefits for Temporary Help Services Workers (visited Oct. 4,1999)
<http:/www.bls.gov/news.release/occomp.toc.htm> (noting that even when temporary
service agencies offer benefits to workers, the workers often do not meet eligibility
requirements or elect not to participate).
38. See generally Gold, supra note 4, at 5-6 ("Research strongly supports the link
between insurance coverage and access to health care.").
39. See 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at 21. See generally Geoffrey D.
Paulin & Elizabeth M. Dietz, Bureau Lab. Stat., Health Insurance Coverage for Families
with Children: Findings from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://bls.gov/orest/st950150.htm> (concluding that families with full or partial coverage
request more services); Geoffrey D. Paulin & Wolf D. Weber, Bureau of Lab. Stat., The
Effects of Health Insurance Status on Consumer Spending (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://stats.bls.gov/orest/st950160.htm>.
The Surgeon General's lecent report on the state of oral health in the United States
offers similar observations with respect to the consumption of dental services by uninsured
persons:
Uninsured children are 2.5 times less likely than insured children to receive
dental care. Children from families without dental insurance are 3 times more
likely to have dental needs than children with either public or private insurance.
For each child without medical insurance, there are at least 2.6 children without
dental insurance.
U.S. Dept Health and Hum. Services, Oral Health in America: A Report of the Surgeon
General-Executive Summary 2 (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.nider.nih.gov/sgr/
oralhealth.htm>. The Surgeon General reported that the number of adults who lack dental
insurance is three times greater than the number who lack medical insurance. See id. at 3.
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retirement compensation. By some estimates, the present value of the
medical insurance offered to a typical retiree upon retirement amounts to as
much as $35,000.40 In 1997, the Government Accounting Office analyzed
the costs that 750 retirees of Pabst Brewing Company in Milwaukee might
face upon termination of their plan and reported that the annual cost of
purchasing standard family coverage would be approximately $8,200.41
Thus, the ability to participate in a retiree medical plan is a significant
financial boon to a person entering into retirement. Even when cost-
sharing components are introduced, the recipient of retiree medical benefits
is still able to take advantage of group insurance rates offered to employer-
based groups.42 This is a particularly important feature to many early
retirees who have not yet reached the age required to receive Medicare
benefits. 43 Even Medicare-eligible retirees can receive a benefit from
participation in a retiree medical benefit plan by obtaining coverage for
services that are not typically covered by Medicare.4
Against this background, the contraction of employee health plans in
general and retiree medical plans in particular can threaten the ability of
individuals to obtain adequate insurance coverage and compromise the
ability of the national health care system to absorb the cost of caring for the
newly uninsured.45 Between 1987 and 1993 the percentage of the non-
elderly population who received coverage through employment-based plans
declined from 69.2 to 63.5, while the percentage of recipients of public
health insurance rose from 13.3% to 16.7% and the percentage of uninsured
40. See Charles S. Mishkind, The Controversy over the Duration of an Employer's
Obligation to Continue to Provide Health and Welfare Benefits to Retirees - A Management
Perspective, Paper Presented at The National Employment Law Institute's First Annual
Advanced-Level ERISA Litigation Program (June 8-9, 1995). Mishkind cites a Towers
Perrin study as the source of his assertion. See generally Bruce D. Pingree, Current Issues
in Tennination and Modification of Welfare Plans, 14 TAx MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J.
311,312 (1986).
41. See GAO REPORT 97-150, supra note 5, at 3.
42. See id. at I I (stating that retiree health insurance offers two advantages to retirees:
(I) more affordable health benefits and (2) access to benefits for retirees whose health status
might adversely affect their ability to obtain affordable coverage in the individual insurance
market); accord GAO REPORT 98-133, supra note 5, at 4-5 (reporting that the premiums for
popular health insurance in the individual markets of Colorado and Vermont are twice the
average retiree contribution for employer subsidized family coverage).
43. See GAO REPORT 97-150, supra note 5, at 4.
44. See id. at Appendix II, 22 (describing Medicare benefits as "more convoluted" and
containing "more gaps" than the plans generally offered by large employers).
45. See generally WILLIAM S. CUSTER & PAT KETSCHE, HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF
AMERICA, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND THE UNINSURED 7-8 (1998), available at
<http:llwww.hiaa.orglpubs/pubs-titles/Research.htm> (visited Oct. 10, 1999) (noting a
sharp decline in the percentage of Americans with employment-based health insurance in
the early 1990s, followed by a slight rise in employment-based health insurance coverage in
the mid-1990s, coupled with an increase in the number of uninsured).
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rose from 14.8% to 17.3%.46 Although these percentages remained roughly
stable between 1993 and 1996,47 the fact that employment-based insurance
did not increase during a period of national prosperity48 suggests a
reluctance among employers to continue to bear the burden of subsidizing
health insurance. Since private employment-based health plans are the
single most significant source of health care financing in the United States,
even a gradual abatement of employment-based health insurance has a
distressing impact on the national health care financing system.49 Whether
the reduction in the overall rate of employment-based insurance stems from
employers' responses to declining rates of industrialization 0 or the rising
costs of health care,51 the message remains clear: fewer individuals can rely
on promises of employment-based insurance.
2
46. See 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at table 1. The data reflects the
Employee Benefits Research Institute's analysis of the March 1988-1998 Current Population
Survey.
The decline in employment-based insurance and the corresponding rise in the rates of
public insurance illustrate one way in which the cost of providing care is shifting to the
public. Less easily documented is the manner in which health care providers shift the cost
of uncompensated care to third-party payors, and indirectly, to those who purchase
insurance from the third-party payors. For an interesting discussion of this issue based on
an empirical study of a California hospital emergency room, see Erik Olsen, Note, No Room
at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1994).
47. See 1999 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 4, at table I; CUSTER & KETSCHE, supra
note 45.
48. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. Comm., Household Income at Record High: Poverty Declines
in 1998 (visited Oct. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.census.gov1Press-Release/Nvwv/l1999/cb99-
188.html> (citing 1998 as the fourth straight year of growth in real median household
income and the year with the highest income levels ever recorded).
49. See 1994 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 34, at 158. See generally Mary E.
O'Connell, Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity of Contingent Workers, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 889, 889 (1995) (explaining that contingent employees have limited access to
social welfare benefits). For an analysis of the disproportionate effect of the decline of
health insurance on minorities and women, see Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe:
Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1421 (1992) [hereinafter
On The Fringe].
50. See Craig Renner & Vicente Navarro, Why is Our Population of Uninsured and
Underinsured Persons Growing? The Consequences of the 'Deindustrialization' of
America, 10 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 85, 85-94 (1989).
51. The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) reports that employers who
elected not to offer health benefits cited the expense of premiums and concern over future
health care costs as the most significant reasons for not providing health care. See CLARE
LIPPERT & ELLIOT WICKS, HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, CRITICAL
DISTINCTIONS: How FIRMS THAT OFFER HEALTH BENEFITS DIFFER FROM THOSE THAT DO
NOT 14 (1991). A more recent study commissioned by the HIAA attributes the increase of
health care costs relative to family income as the "primary reason" for the rise of uninsured
Americans. See CUSTER & KETSCHE, supra note 45, at 4.
52. Professor Mary O'Connell has analyzed the disproportionate impact of these
reductions on part-time and low wage workers, the majority of whom are women and
minorities. See On The Fringe, supra note 49, at 1422. The same point is made in less
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This concern resounds even more clearly in the reduction of retiree
medical plans. In the 1980s, sixty to seventy percent of large employers
reportedly sponsored retiree medical plans. 3 In the following decade, this
number declined to fewer than 40 percent, a reduction that may have a
significant impact on future retirees.54 During the 1990s, changes in
accounting rules provoked some employers to amend or terminate their
promises of retiree health benefits. In 1990, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board approved a change in the method of accounting for retiree
benefits, popularly known as FASB 106. 6 Unlike the previous practice of
deferring notation of a corporation's promise for retiree benefits until an
employee is retired, the new rule requires employers to recognize the
liability for future retiree health benefits on current balance sheets.57 In
practical terms, FASB 106 requires a company to accrue anticipated future
benefits from the date the employer grants credit for those benefits until the
date of eligibility.58 Any shortfall in plan assets must be recorded as a
liability. When the rule became effective for fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 1992, many corporations that had promised retiree health
benefits to their employees suddenly faced dramatic changes in their
balance sheets.59 As a result, increasing numbers of employers reduced the
detail by the Employee Benefits Research Institute in their analysis of population survey
data from 1994. See 1994 POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 34, at 6.
53. See GAO REPORT 98-133, supra note 5 at 7.
54. See id.
55. See generally John Mintz & Kathleen Day, Health Care's Painful Changes: More
Retirees Are Left In the Lurch As Firms Slash Health Coverage, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1993, at HI (affirming that staggering numbers of retirees are without adequate health
coverage).
56. The Financial Accounting Standards Board theorized that post-retirement benefits,
including retiree health benefits, were a form of deferred compensation and therefore
studied the accounting methodology used with respect to such benefits for over a decade.
See Michael Melbinger & Marianne Culver, FASB Issues Statement on Employers'
Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits, 19 TAX MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 115
(1991). For an analysis of FASB 106 and its impact on retiree medical benefits, see Ford,
supra note 28, at 235-41; Ossi, supra note 28, at 235-41; see also Allan Karnes et al., A
Strong Dose of Medicine from FASB: New Rules for Employers' Accounting for Post-
retirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, 17 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 52 (1992);
Irwin Rubin, Providing and Accounting for Retiree Health Benefits: A Necessary
Compromise, 20 TAx MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 62 (1992). For an analysis of some
of the legal issues related to proposed amendments inspired by FASB 106, see James E.
Holloway & Douglas K. Schneider, ERISA, FASB, and Benefit Plan Amendments: A Section
402(b)(3) Violation As a Loss Contingency for a Plan Amendment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 97
(1997).
57. This requirement parallels the requirement, announced in FASB 87 and 88, that the
future costs of defined benefit pension plans be accrued and reported. See Melbinger &
Culver, supra note 56.
58. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 5.
59. See id. at 3. When they calculated their liabilities for post-retirement health care
benefits for the first time, some large corporations recognized significant charges. See
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level of benefits provided under retiree health plans, increased cost-sharing
requirements or terminated plans altogether.60
Even employees and retirees who still actively participate in
employer-provided health plans may find that their plans' cost-containment
features force them to confront medical expenses that exceed the level of
61their insurance protection. Much of the reduction in the value of medical
benefits results from the increasing desire of employers to reduce the cost
of providing employee health plans.62 In recent years, many employers
have eschewed first-dollar indemnity insurance in favor of plans designed
63
to promote one or more cost-containment strategies. In theory, the
implementation of cost-containment methods both enhances the employee's
understanding of health insurance as compensation and limits his incentive
to utilize benefits. 64 By declining or limiting medical care, an employee
generally LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 4, at 212-13 (discussing FASB 106 write-offs of
$2.3 billion (IBM), $6.6 billion (AT&T) and $20.8 billion (General Motors)). These
charges have been connected to an average decline of 4.6% in the annual pre-tax profits of
322 companies surveyed by Perrin Towers and an increase of 3% in payroll costs for those
same companies. See id. at 213 (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF 25
(June 1994)).
60. The Washington Post reported that a Foster Higgins survey revealed that as many as
two-thirds of employers had recently altered their retiree medical plans or would do so
during 1993. See Mintz & Day, supra note 55, at HI. A 1995 survey by Buck Consultants
suggested that 51% of responding employers had modified or considered modifying existing
post-retirement non-pension benefit programs. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
supra note 31, at 5 (citing BUCK CONSULTANTS, ANALYSIS OF POST-RETIREMENT AND
POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT DISCLOSURES FROM CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: FAS
No. 106 AND. FAS No. 112 (1995) (reporting that the most common modification of 489
Fortune 1000 companies adopting FAS 106 was a change in cost-sharing (29%), caps on
company contributions (22%), and adjustment to retiree contribution amounts (17%))).
Retirees whose health insurance is terminated may find it difficult to obtain similarly priced
individual coverage. See GAO REPORT 97-150, supra note 5, at 12-13. See generally
Donald H. Seifman & Mark B. Wychulis, Changing or Eliminating Retiree lVelfare
Benefits, 18 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 70 (1992).
61. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Notes from the Insurance Underground: How the
Chronically Ill Cope, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 633 (1994).
62. See Mintz & Day, supra note 55.
63. Even when the statistics regarding overall employee participation in health
insurance plans remain stable, changes in the quality or extent of coverage can occur. See
generally Bureau of Lab. Statistics, Employee Benefits In Medium and Large Private
Establishments, 1997 tbl. 5 (visited Oct. 4, 1999) <ftp://146.142.4.23/pub/news.release/
history/ebs3.010799.news> [hereinafter Medium and Large Private Establishments) (citing
an increase in managed care and fees). Many employers have adopted managed care
strategies. According to the Employee Benefits Research Institute, the percentage of
individuals with private insurance who participated in traditional indemnity insurance
programs fell from 72.6% in 1988 to 33.3% in 1993. See 1994 POPULATION SURVEY, supra
note 34, at 6. Likewise, the General Accounting Office reported that between 1987 and
1996, enrollment in employment-based managed care plans increased from 27% to 74%.
See GAO REPORT 97-150, supra note 5, at 14, n.16; see also Gold, supra note 4, at 8-10.
64. See generally CLAUDE HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 187-88
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not only saves cash wages or other resources that would be necessary to
pay his deductible or co-payment, but also the amount that his employer
would have to spend.65
Cost-sharing directly reduces the value that an employee or retiree
receives from his medical plan. For example, employee health plans now
66 6typically require an employee to pay premiums, deductibles, 7 and
copayments. 5 Many plans now include maximum benefit levels, which
limit the benefits for which an employee is eligible during a plan year or, in
some cases, during the employee's lifetime.69 Employee health plans
frequently reduce the risk assumed by the employer or insurer by excluding
a variety of specific conditions or procedures, including well-care,70
(2d ed. 1998) (stating that "[c]ost-sharing ... is the most common example of a coverage
limitation used by insurers of all kinds.., to combat moral hazard"); Evan M. Melhado,
Economists, Public Provision, and the Market: Changing Values in Policy Debate, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 215, 225 (1998) (citing a declining faith in the utility of health care
services).
65. See generally Gold, supra note 4, at 10. For a recent analysis of the role of co-
payments and other cost-containment measures in plans providing mental health coverage,
see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT - DESPITE NEw FEDERAL
STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED, GAO REP. 00-95, 6-7 (May
2000) (noting that employers and health insurance carriers "often limit mental health
coverage through the use of plan design features that can be more restrictive for mental
health benefits than for medical and surgical benefits[,]" including annual dollar limits,
limits on the number of outpatient visits and higher deductibles, copayments or insurance).
66. In 1997, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 69% of full-time employees
participating in employer-sponsored health plans were required to contribute towards the
cost of their own coverage. See Medium and Large Private Establishments, supra note 63.
The Health Insurance Association of America reports that the average private fn-m employee
is required to pay 15% of the premium for individual coverage under an employee health
plan and 30% of the premium for family coverage. See MARIANNE MILLER & THOMAS
DIAL, HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
INSURANCE IN PRIVATE SECTOR FIRMS IN 1992 5 (1993); see also Gold, supra note 4, at 7-8.
67. According to the Health Insurance Association of America, 95% of private sector
employees in traditional indemnity plans, 33% of employees in POS plans, and 69% of
employees who participate in a PPO plan pay a deductible. See MILLER & DIAL, supra note
66, at 5; see also Medium and Large Private Establishments, supra note 63.
68. See generally id. (citing an increase in co-insurance).
69. The Health Insurance Association of America reports that maximum lifetime
benefit levels apply to all but 21% of employees in an indemnity plan, 22% of employees in
a PPO arrangement and 43% of employees in a POS plan. See MILLER & DIAL, supra note
66, at 6, tbl. 4; see also Medium and Large Private Establishments, supra note 63, at tbl. 8.
70. In a 1993 report to the Health Insurance Association of America, Miller and Dial
observed the difficulty in describing a "typical health plan from the standpoint of services
covered." Their research, based on a 1992 survey of 2,156 employers, suggests insured
private sector employees received certain well-care services in the following percentages:
adult routine physicals - 52%; routine mammography screening - 80%; routine pap smears -
73%; well baby care - 65%; well child care - 59 %; childhood immunizations - 66%. See
MILLER & DIAL, supra note 66, at 9-10.
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experimental treatments,7' and treatments categorized as unnecessary.
72
Despite the changes enacted by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, limited exclusions of preexisting conditions continue to
be permissible.73
The amendment or termination of an employee health plan may
jeopardize the financial security of employees and retirees. In 1977, 12.6%
of non-elderly persons with private insurance risked a one in one-hundred
chance of incurring out-of-pocket medical expenses that exceeded 10% of
their income.74 Ten years later, this figure had risen to 18.9% of the
population, an increase of 50%.75 In Suggs v. Pan American Life Insurance
71. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1992) (stating that experimental
procedures are not covered in order to maximize the health status of the overall population);
Jennifer Belk, Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health
Insurance Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REv. 809, 809 (1991)
(discussing how insurers manipulate the often undefined "experimental treatments"
exclusion to refuse treatments that are costly).
72. Managed care strategies increasingly burden an employee with the expense of
medical care that falls outside strict interpretations of medical necessity. The increasingly
common use of prospective utilization review, for example, limits the employee's access to
insurance for approved procedures or treatments that do not meet with the reviewer's
approval. Provider networks also limit the employee's ability to attend the health care
provider of his choice. See generally Jeffrey Ralph Pettit, Help! We've Fallen and We Can't
Get Up: The Problems Families Face Because of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46
VAND. L. REV. 779, 789 (1993) (suggesting that insurance policies that utilize ambiguous
exclusions may effectively deny payments for treatments that are too expensive rather than
experimental).
73. According to the data collected in the 1987 National Medical Care Expenditure
Survey, almost one third of privately insured persons were covered by plans that limited
mental health coverage to 30 or fewer visits, while 86.8% of the persons who were insured
did not receive full coverage of well-child visits. See Pamela Farley Short & Jessica
Banthin, New Estimates of the Underinsured Younger than 65 Years, 274 JAMA 1302
(1995). While not necessarily inconsistent with the results reported by Miller and Dial, the
comparison of these figures suggests that the mere fact of coverage is not evidence of the
sufficiency of that coverage.
Before the enactment of HIPAA, which now limits the use and duration of pre-
existing condition limitations, see 29 U.S.C. § 1181, pre-existing conditions were frequently
the subject of blanket exclusions from coverage. By some reports, as many as 63% of
participants in traditional indemnity insurance plans and 72% of participants in preferred
provider networks lacked coverage for preexisting conditions for an average of nine months
between 1988 and 1992. See Findlay, Is There a Crisis? Absolutely! 12(3) Bus. & HEALTH
50 (1994) (citing a study by John Gable, KPMG Peat Marwick research director). HIPAA
now restricts the ability of employers and insurers to enact strict exclusions for pre-existing
conditions, but it has not entirely abolished the practice.
74. See Pamela J. Farley, Who Are the Uninsured? 63 MILBANK MEMOFIAL FUND Q.
476, 484 (1985) (analyzing data from the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey).
75. See Short & Banthin, supra note 73. These results are consistent with the results of
a study conducted by the University of Michigan School of Public Health, which
demonstrated that 19% of the state's juvenile population were insured by plans that excluded
coverage for physician outpatient fees, lacked coverage or participated in inadequate
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Co., the court explained:
In most instances of health insurance coverage, for "employees
and their beneficiaries," the plaintiff is extremely vulnerable. For
a wage earner who is earning no more than enough to provide
food, clothing and shelter, an unexpected large medical bill, not
covered by insurance, although he felt confident he was covered,
can be devastating. It can deprive an employee and his family of
medical care, it can cause extreme hardship if he attempts to pay
the medical expenses at the expense of other necessary living
expenses, or it can force him into bankruptcy as plaintiff alleges
happened in this case.
76
It would be tempting and understandable to look to the major
legislation that governs employee benefit plans in order to determine
whether the reduction of health benefits for employees and retirees poses
problems that Congress had tried to remedy. In the preamble to ERISA,
Congress stated its concern for the "lack of employee information and
adequate safeguards" prevalent among employee benefit plans.77 ERISA
responded to these problems by requiring all employee benefit plans to
report and disclose financial information as well as salient plan provisions
and imposing standards of conduct for fiduciaries, as well as minimum
enforcement provisions.7
However, as its name suggests, the primary concern of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was the protection of pension
benefits. Therefore, Congress placed additional regulations on pension
plans covering vesting, funding and participation. 9 In contrast, welfare
plans, including employee health plans, operate free from similar
requirements for vesting of benefits. 80
Congress' decision to exempt welfare plans from vesting requirements
is a direct corollary of its decision to maintain a system which permits, but
does not require, employers to provide employee benefit plans."'
policies. See Third of Michigan's Children Have No or Inadequate Insurance, HEALTH
CARE DAILY (BNA) Oct. 17, 1994, at D9.
76. 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1356-57 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
78. See id. § 1001(b).
79. See id. § 1001(c).
80. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995)
(explaining that ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided
health benefits or any other kind of welfare benefits); Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d
897, 908 (6th Cir. 1988); Hamilton v. Textron Lycoming, Inc., No.B-88-379, 1990 WL
357284, at *9 (D. Conn. June 12, 1990) (holding that employers retain flexibility when they
offer welfare benefits to state in the plan documents that such benefits vest, may be
modified, or terminated at any time).
81. Professor Catherine Fisk argues that "ERISA jurisprudence reflects the ideological
operation of voluntarism (the idea that Congress did not mandate employee benefits but left
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Employers may volunteer or bargain to provide pension and welfare
benefits as employee compensation, but they are not required to do so.
8 2
The arguments offered against establishing vesting standards for welfare
plans emphasized the plan sponsor's inability to control costs that could rise
due to outside factors.83 Unlike the cost of a pension plan, which could be
predicted using actuarial calculations based on "fairly stable data," the cost
of providing benefits under a health plan might be subject to variations in
the cost of medical treatment or unforeseen advances in medical practice or
technology.8 4 Persuaded by the suggestion that cost-sensitive employers
might refrain from promising welfare benefits that they could not change,"
Congress exempted welfare plans from vesting requirements.
86
In the absence of specific statutorily imposed vesting requirements,
sponsors of employee health plans have virtually free rein over the duration
of benefits under health plans. Unless a sponsor waives its right to amend
or modify the terms of a welfare plan 7 or violates a specific statutory
mandate for benefits, 8 the sponsor may reduce or eliminate benefits
employers free to volunteer benefits) within the constraints of "bounded obligations and
federal common law." Fisk, supra note 15, at 153.
82. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 78.
83. See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that automatic vesting was rejected as an option because of fluctuation and
unpredictable costs associated with them).
84. See id. Although generally presented as the rationale against vesting any welfare
benefits, this argument is less persuasive with benefits outside the health area. Costs of life
insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance can also be predicted using
actuarial calculations that are just as stable as the data required for calculating pension costs.
Furthermore, severance plans are simply contractual promises to pay income over a limited
period of time.
85. See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that Congress balanced its desire to extensively regulate existing plans against the
possibility that employers would be deterred from establishing new plans if extensive
regulation were implemented).
86. Congress' decision to permit employers to amend or terminate promised welfare
benefits resonates throughout Circuit Court decisions in this area. See, e.g., Gable v.
Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 R3d 851, 860 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing that if employers were
prohibited from making plan amendments they might not offer insurance at all); Owens v.
Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 400 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (stating that ERISA does not prohibit a
company from terminating previously offered benefits that are neither vested nor accrued);
Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 940 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that all circuit
courts agree that ERISA does not prohibit a company from eliminating previously offered
benefits that are neither vested nor accrued); see also Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905
F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990); Sejman v. Warner-Lambert, 889 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1990);
Moore, 856 F.2d at 488.
87. Although ERISA does not require an employer to offer benefits or to vest an
employee in those benefits, the parties may nonetheless agree that the benefits vest or that
particular aspects of a plan will not be changed over a certain period of time. See, e.g.,
Gable, 35 F.3d at 851.
88. See 29 U.S.C § 1001(b)(1982).
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offered without sanctions under ERISA. 9  Courts have upheld an
employer's decision to reduce or eliminate benefits or to terminate plans
altogether. 90 Only when an employer has actually made a decision to vest
his employees' health benefits is this prerogative limited.91
The critical issue facing both administrators and beneficiaries of
employee health benefit plans is how to determine whether an employer
has in fact entered into a contractual obligation to vest benefits. In most
cases, it is in the employer's best interest to offer health benefits that are
clearly unvested and to retain the right to amend or terminate the plan.92 In
order to underscore the employer's right to amend or terminate a plan,
many health insurance plans now include what is commonly known as a
reservation of rights clause.93 This is a provision that, in its most standard
form, preserves the employer's ability to amend or change the plan at will.
94
Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which employers have
determined that it is in their best interest to override the presumption
against vesting retirement benefits and limiting their right to amend plans.95
For example, negotiations between an employer and a union may result in
the establishment of a collectively bargained agreement which clearly
specifies that health benefits are vested.96
89. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 78. The GAO REPORT 97-150, supra note 5,
at 3, describes "an employer's freedom to modify the conditions of coverage or to terminate
benefits" as a key characteristic of America's voluntary, employer-based system of health
insurance."
90. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 981 (1992).
91. See, e.g., Gable, 35 F.3d at 851.
92. See, e.g., McGann, 946 F.2d at401.
93. See GAO-REPORT 97-150, supra note 5 (citing the U.S. Department of Labor,
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Division of Technical Assistance and
Inquiries). An example of a typical reservation of rights clause is included in a question-
and-answer brochure issued by the Department of Labor: "The company reserves the right
to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or change the program, in whole or in part, at any
time." Id. at 25.
94. See, e.g., McGann, 946 F.2d at 405 (stating that the employers reservation of the
right to amend supports the contention that the employer never promised that benefits were
permanent). See generally, Fisk, supra note 15, at 156-57.
95. See, e.g., Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes, 93 F.3d 243, 250, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1059
(1997); Golden, 954 F. Supp. 1173, 1183 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating SPDs are
indistinguishable from SPDs in Helwig case and establish promise of lifetime healthcare
coverage).
96. See, e.g., Maurer v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 212 F.3d 907 (6" Cir. 2000) (stating
collective bargaining agreement demonstrates that parties intended to vest retiree health
benefits); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 954 F. Supp. at 1187 (finding language in collective
bargaining agreements "directly tie[s] retiree eligibility for health care coverage to pension
entitlement and therefore is a clear indicia that Kelsey-Hayes intended to provide lifetime
health care coverage"); Jansen v. Greyhound Corp., 692 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (N.D. Iowa
1987) (finding that "it was the parties' intent and understanding that the retiree medical
insurance benefits provided under the 1979 agreement were to continue undiminished for
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However, between these two unequivocal cases lie many more
enigmatic patterns of communication between employers and employees.
Are employees to regard their health benefits as vested when an employer
says he will create a vested plan but writes a plan document with a
reservation of rights clause?97  Should employees who read a plan
document with a reservation of rights clause be able to rely on subsequent
oral assurances that health benefits will be available for their lifetimes? 9
What about employees who possess a summary plan description that refers
to lifetime benefits, but makes no reference to the reservation of rights
clause that appears in the formal plan document?99
These questions suggest that the analysis of contractual promises
regarding vesting or other benefit features is not a mechanical exercise.
Indeed, a statutorily imposed vesting requirement seems a simple concept
when balanced against the many nuances that exist in trying to discern and
interpret contractual vesting rights. Yet, for all the complexity that arises
in the absence of a statutory mandate, this is familiar territory. Disputes
between employees and their employers about whether benefits are vested
simply call us to examine whether promises have been made and, if so,
whether they have been broken.10°
the lifetime of the retirees").
97. Compare, e.g., In re Unisys Corp., 58 F.3d 896, 903 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
fact that plans used terms such as "lifetime" to describe retiree medical benefits and
contained a reservation of rights clause does not render a plan internally inconsistent and
ambiguous) with Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that a
layperson reading Unisys might view the case with a "quizzical expression").
98. See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)
(refusing to accept plaintiffs reliance on oral assurances).
99. See, e.g., Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 8511 F.2d 134 (611 Cir. 1988)
(discussing that clear promises of lifetime coverage in SPD prevailed over reservation of
right to amend in plan document).
100. The Supreme Court's opinion in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch instructed
courts to use the law of trusts and contracts to guide the development of a federal common
law of ERISA. The Court stated:
As they do with contractual provisions, courts construe terms in trust
agreements without deferring to either party's interpretation... The terms of
trusts created by written instruments are determined by the provisions of the
instrument as interpreted in light of all the circumstances and such other
evidence of the intention of the settlor with respect to the trust as is not
inadmissible.
The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial
interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA.
Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before enactment of
ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the plan did not give the
employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe uncertain
terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any other
contract claim by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifestations of
the parties' intent.
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II. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Striking a balance between informal communications and written
documents is hardly a novel undertaking for courts accustomed to
interpreting contracts or trusts.tm The express terms of ERISA borrow
from traditional doctrines of contract law in order to protect contractual
promises of employee benefits and from the tenets of trust law to guide the
489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4, cmt. d (1959))
(emphasis added).
The Court's opinion in Firestone has come to stand for many principles other than
those set out in the above words. But, Firestone does give life to the idea that traditional
notions of trust and contract law should figure into the analysis of plan language.
101. Among the classic commentaries on the parol evidence rule are the following: 3
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-96 (1960 and Supp.) [hereinafter
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS]; SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 631-47 (3d ed. 1961); John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of
Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L. J. 333 (1967); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 161 (1965) [hereinafter The
Interpretation of Words]; John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4
DUQ. L. REv. 337 (1966); John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and
Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PENN. L.
REv. 1342 (1975).
For more recent analyses, see Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and
hnplied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 35 (1985); Metzger, The Parol
Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 1383. For a modem economic analysis of the parol
evidence rule, see Eric Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contract Interpretation, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 533 (1998). For a critical
analysis of the parol evidence rule as a manifestation of the struggle of power and
knowledge in contract law, see Claire Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1048-52 (1985).
For articles that examine the application of the parol evidence rule in specific states,
see, for example, Scott Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark, 55
MONT. L. REV. 93, 133 (1994) (parol evidence rule and fraud exception in Montana); David
Dow, The Confused State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas, 59 TEX. B.J. 616, 618 (1996)
(revising and expanding an essay of the same name published at 35 S. TEx. L. REv. 457
(1994) (reviewing Texas law)); Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On Parol: The
Construction and Interpretation of Written Agreements and The Role of Extrinsic Evidence
in Contract Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657 (1997) (Texas); Olivia Karlin and Louis
Karlin, The California Parol Evidence Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 1361 (1992) (California
law); Stephen J. Lubben, Chief Justice Traynor's Contract Jurisprudence and the Free Law
Dilemma: Nazisim, The Judiciary, and California's Contract Law, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
81 (1998) (California law); Susan Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There is a Parol
Evidence Rule in California - the Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1995)
(California); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131 (1995) (Alaska, California, Montana, Oregon, Washington).
For an interesting analogy between modem interpretations of the parol evidence rule
and current trends in statutory interpretation, see Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The
Modern Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for New Textualist Statutory
Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998).
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behavior of plan fiduciaries. °z Thus, courts have recognized that many of
the traditional canons of interpretation apply to the construction of ERISA
plans under federal common law. 10 3 While ERISA borrows from contract
and trust common law, the loosely defined prescriptions for the
development of federal common law have enabled courts to re-examine the
maxims of traditional common law in light of the goals of ERISA. ERISA
has thus often marked the common law and the canons of its interpretation
with its own stamp.' °4  Yet a re-examination of the familiar and
fundamental principles of the common law may yield helpful results in
trying to understand ERISA jurisprudence.0 5
The parol evidence rule and its role in contract interpretation have
been the battlefield for many struggles between formalism and realism.' °6
Pitting formalists such as Samuel Williston against challengers led by
Arthur Corbin, the battle over form versus substance commanded much of
the legal community's attention during the middle of the century.1
0 7
Formalists, like Williston, sought the certainty and continuity of clearly
defined legal rules.'0 8 For example, if a contract contained an integration
clause, then it was fully integrated and extrinsic evidence did not play a
significant role in interpretation unless documentation was incomplete or
there were issues of fraud or mistake.'0 9 Challengers, such as Corbin,
seemed to gain acceptance in later years as the legal community became
suspicious of the ability of writings (and the language itself) to achieve the
formalists' goal of certainty and continuity."n While, in recent years,
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st
Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Protexall, Inc., 50 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 1995); Burnham v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989).
104. See, e.g., Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that ERISA
supersedes all state law, including decisional law relating to a plan and the court rejects state
law contract interpretation in light of ERISA); Tinsley v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.
Supp. 1547, 1550 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (stating that ERISA preempts all state law, including
decisional law; therefore plaintiffs attempt to apply state common law principles of contract
construction is inappropriate and the court must instead consider the claim in light of the
principles of ERISA).
105. ERISA also borrows from the common law of trusts. Therefore, it is noteworthy
that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 21, cmt. a, refers to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 209, 210, 213-16 (1981) for an explanation of the parol evidence rule and its
application to contracts.
106. See generally Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and
the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 512 (1990) (describing the differences
between Williston's and Corbin's views of contract law).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 525.
109. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 338 (citing 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed. 1961)).
110. See Klau, supra note 106, at 528.
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academic legal philosophers may have moved on to different battlegrounds,
it is worth noting that the quarrel between formalism and realism has
persisted in the field of contract interpretation. Judge Kozinski of the
California Supreme Court, for example, mounted a serious formalistic
challenge to the Corbinian paradigms of contract interpretation adopted
long ago by California courts under the lead of Judge Traynor's opinion in
Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. G.W. Thomas Drayage and Rigging
Co.
111
The federal common law of ERISA borrows from contract and trust
law and is developed by judges with familiarity with the traditions of
contract and trust interpretation. Therefore, it is not surprising that ERISA
jurisprudence is replete with the same tensions that have erupted in the
analysis of more traditional aspects of contract and trust law. ERISA, with
its unique balancing of contract and trust precepts, has fashioned a legal
tradition in which formalism has not gone out of style.112 In debates on the
interpretation of the statute, formalist arguments frequently emerge as
contributions to and, occasionally, as the solutions to the conundrums
involved in discerning, understanding and interpreting documents that
govern ERISA plans."'
Therefore, in the field of employee benefits, the critique of formalist
thinking offered by commentators such as Arthur Corbin remains highly
appropriate. How do we know if an ERISA plan document is fully
integrated? How is one to detect an ambiguity in the plan document itself?.
In contract law, Corbin argues that when such questions arise no relevant
evidence, whether oral or informal, should be excluded from
consideration.114 Corbin's challenge to the narrow use of extrinsic evidence
in the interpretation of contracts should resound with clarity when the field
of interpretation is narrowed to ERISA plans.
To hear the echoes of Corbin's questions in the adjudication of ERISA
disputes, one must begin with the analysis of parol evidence under basic
contracts law. An obvious problem in adjudicating disputes over the
interpretation of a contract or trust document is how to dispose of evidence
other than the simple written instrument. As a substantive rule of law, 15
the parol evidence rule devalues evidence that contradicts an integrated
111. 69 Cal. 2d 33(Cai. 1968). See generally, Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564,569 (9"' Cir. 1988); Martin-Davidson, supra note 101.
112. See generally, Fisk, supra note 15.
113. See id. at 184-188.
114. See COR3IN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 573 (1960) ("On these issues, no
relevant evidence, whether parol or otherwise, is excluded."); see also The Interpretation of
Words, supra note 101, at 172-173.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213, cmt. a (1981) (stating that the
parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law).
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written contract.1 6 Corbin formulated the parol evidence rule as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and
accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
writing.
1 17
In contrast, a contract that is not fully integrated does not receive the
unqualified protection of the parol evidence rule.18 Similar principles apply
to the evaluation of parol evidence in the interpretation of a trust
document.1 1 9
While the parol evidence rule itself is easy to describe, the difficulty
comes in knowing when a document deserves such steadfast protection.
Corbin took an expansive view of the role of extrinsic evidence. He
envisioned three situations in which extrinsic evidence should be offered:
first, in order to determine whether the written words in the contract were
the complete and exclusive integration of the agreed terms; second, in order
to determine whether the contract should be voided for reasons such as
fraud, accident, or mistake; and third, in order to aid in the interpretation of
the contract itself.12° Since fraud, accident and mistake are anomalies in the
bargaining process, my discussion is confined to the first and third of these
issues, which seem to me to be more likely to present themselves in ERISA
jurisprudence.
116. See generally, Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 1383 (tracing
the foundations of the parol evidence rule to (a) a belief that the written word protected
parties against fraud or perjury more effectively than reliance on oral evidence; (b) an
assumption that judges are better suited than juries to protect against perjured testimony; (c)
a desire for predictability and certainty in the conduct of business; and (d) the basic
contractual rule that later final expressions of intent should prevail over earlier tentative
expressions).
117. CORBnN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 573. For a discussion of the
formulation of the parol evidence rule by other scholars, see Calamari & Perillo, supra note
101, at 334-35 (comparing Williston and Corbin); Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra
note 20, at 1391-92.
118. See Doyle v. Northrop Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1318, 1332-33 (D.N.J. 1978); David
Nassif Assoc. v. United States, 557 F.2d 249, 256 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See generally Murray,
supra note 101, at 342 (stating that the purpose of the rule is to afford special protection to
subsequent written expressions of agreement).
119. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 38 cmt. a (1959);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 21 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1 1996); SCOTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS Sec. 38 (4th ed. 2000).
120. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 573; The Interpretation of Words,
supra note 101, at 172-173.
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A. Integration
In its most simplistic manifestation, an integration is a writing to
which the parties assent as the full statement of the terms of their
agreement.12 1 The concept of integration assumes that a written document
embraces all of the terms, conditions, and intentions of the parties who
enter into the contract. It also admits, as both a theoretical possibility and
an undeniable reality, that many writings do not achieve this goal. The
dual paradigms of fully and partially integrated contracts reflect the
difficulty that parties face in molding the written word of their agreement.
A fully integrated contract is the complete and final expression of the entire
agreement between the parties. 122  A partially integrated contract
completely expresses the parties' agreement on the issues addressed in the
contract, but it is not the final integration of the parties' agreement on any
other terms.' 23
Thus, the working paradigms of parol evidence admit that parties to a
contract may achieve full integration or, intentionally or not, they may fall
short and execute a partially integrated contract. It is also possible that
what appears to be a contract is in fact not integrated at all. 2
Therefore, from the outset complete integration is an elusive goal.
Since, with few exceptions, parties are free to agree on a wide variety of
terms,'5 drafting an integrated contract is a challenging mission. 26 The
very fact that courts evaluate contracts to determine whether they are
integrated testifies to the difficulties inherent in reducing agreements to
writing.
The parol evidence rule operates differently depending on whether the
writing is fully or partially integrated. 27 Initially the purpose of integration
analysis is therefore to determine whether the rules of complete or partial
integration govern the role of extrinsic evidence. While a fully integrated
contract supersedes all prior arrangements between the parties, a partially
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See generally Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 335-37; Dow, supra note 101.
124. See generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at §§ 577, 582; Calamari &
Perillo, supra note 101, at 336 ("Writings that evidence a contract are not necessarily 'final'
embodiments of the contract.").
125. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d
Cir. 1980) (stating that "commercial parties are free to contract as they desire").
126. On this point, see Burnham, supra note 101, at 100-01.
127. See generally Dow, supra note 101. Dow criticizes Texas courts for failing to
distinguish between the degrees of integration. He concludes that Texas courts use the term
"integrated" to mean "completely integrated" at the initial stage of their analysis only to
abandon the idea of complete integration when they actually apply the rule and therefore,
they end up admitting evidence. See also Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20,
at 1393.
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integrated contract may allow the introduction of certain extrinsic
evidence. 128 As an analytical tool then, the concept of integration itself
neither condemns nor condones agreements that are extrinsic to the written
document. Rather, the purpose of integration analysis is to define the scope
of a writing in order to determine the role that such extrinsic agreements
might play.
129
Depending on the result of this analysis, the doctrine of integration
can either allow the parol evidence rule to bar or to enforce
contemporaneous agreements 3 The protection afforded to an integrated
document enables the parties to "rely on the enforcement of agreements
that have been reduced to writing.' 131 However, equally significant is the
assurance it provides to parties who are able to demonstrate that additional
agreements must operate in harmony with those contained in an
unintegrated or partially integrated document.1
32
In practical terms, courts usually rule on issues of integration only
when the contract has disappointed one or both of the parties' expectations.
Therefore, from the perspective of the parties, the purpose of arguments
about integration and interpretation is to advance the position that will
favor their respective sides. However, it is critical to remember that a
determination of integration is distinct from the process of interpretation or
contract construction. 3 Integration determines only whether parties have
consented to a particular set of words; it does not provide those words with
meaning or determine the legal effect of those words.
134
Exactly how a judge is to go about determining whether a contract is a
"complete and accurate integration" of an agreement between parties is no
small task. 13 To resolve the question of whether a contract is integrated, a
court must consider at least two issues: first, the nature and terms of the
actual agreement between the parties and second, the extent to which the
136writing in question expresses those terms. To put it differently, a court
first must determine whether a contract is integrated and then must evaluate
128. See generally Burnham, supra note 101, at 105.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 106.
131. Beijing Metals and Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., 993 F.2d
1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Jack H. Brown & Co., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, 906 F.2d 169,
174 (5th Cir. 1990)).
132. See id.
133. See CORDIN oN CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 539.
134. See id.
135. See generally Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 1393-94;
Hadjiyannakis, supra note 101, at 45-55 (describing the approaches of Williston, Wigmore,
Corbin, the UCC, and the First and Second Restatements of Contracts to the issue of
integration analysis).
136. See generally supra note 135.
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whether the integration is full or partial.
137
During the first stage of the integration analysis, many formalistic-
minded courts reject offers of extrinsic evidence and examine only the
document itself in order to determine whether it is integrated. 138 Williston,
for one, espoused something similar to the 'four comers' approach.139 In
other words, Williston and like-minded commentators ask whether a
merger clause is present or whether the nature of the document itself (such
as a will) is intended to be complete. 140 After all, a merger or integration
clause suggests that the parties intended to use the parol evidence rule in
order to rule out other indications of what they might have said, done or
meant when they entered into the contract. T4 Extrinsic evidence need not
be considered when these factors are present. The advantage to this
approach is judicial economy, as well as encouraging parties to reduce their
agreements to writing and discouraging fraudulent oral representations
concerning those agreements.' 42 The writing says it all.
In contrast, Corbin took a narrow view regarding the probative worth
of the written contract. A more liberal Corbinian court must first determine
whether a written contract constitutes the complete integration of all of the
terms to which the parties have agreed to under the contract. 143  Corbin's
137. See generally Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 337 ("Once it is determined
that the writing is intended to be final and therefore an integration, it becomes necessary to
ascertain whether the integration is complete (so that it cannot be contradicted or
supplemented) or only partial (so that it cannot be contradicted but may be supplemented by
evidence of consistent additional terms).").
138. Eric Posner has described this approach as "hard." He notes that such courts find a
writing complete on its face if it is detailed, covers many contingencies, and contains a
merger clause. See Posner, supra note 101, at 535.
139. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 338, n.28-31; Murray, supra note 20, at
1360; see also Michael A. Lawrence, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the
Lan, of Contract Revisited, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1071, 1076-77 (1991) (stating that when
parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing, extrinsic evidence should be
excluded).
140. See Burnham, supra note 101, at 128; Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 338.
For a discussion of some of the difficulties in determining whether a writing is complete
under the four comers analysis, see Hadjiyannakis, supra note 101, at 43-45.
141. See generally Dwight J. Davis & Courtland L. Reichman, Understanding the Value
of Integration Clauses, 18SPG FRANCHISE L.J. 135, 136 (1999) (stating that integration
clauses, while not determinative, suggest that a written agreement is fully integrated); R.
Wayne Estes & Kirsten C. Love, The Ubiquitous Yet Illusive 'Merger' Clause in Labor
Agreements: Semantics, Applications, and Effect on Past Practice, 87 KY. L. J. 1, 11-18
(1999) (stating that when an agreement is final and total it cannot be contradicted by
contemporaneous agreements). But see Peter C. Lagarias, The Misuse of Integration, No
Representation, and No Reliance Clauses in the Name of Contract Certainty, 18SPG
FRANCHISE L. J. 3 (1998) (explaining that there is no such thing as certainty in American
contract law and that the use of an integration clause to negate fraud and similar claims is
against public policy).
142. See Posner, supra note 101, at 567-68 (criticizing these arguments).
143. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 573.
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analysis reflected an assumption that a written document was not a contract
itself, but merely the written expression of an agreement made between
parties. By parsing the notion of "contract" from that of a written
document, Corbin argued that "mere inspection of the written document" is
insufficient to determine the response to these issues.
44
This position assumes that it is impossible to conclude whether a
writing expresses the agreement of the parties without the consideration of
extrinsic evidence. 14  Under Corbin's approach,14 6 the purpose of offering
extrinsic evidence for integration analysis is to prove or disprove the ability
of the contract to express completely the agreement between the parties.' 47
As the Fifth Circuit has suggested, a contract may be incomplete for one of
two reasons: first, that the writing is "facially incomplete and requires
extrinsic evidence to clarify, explain or give meaning to its terms," or
second, that "when viewed in light of the circumstances surrounding its
execution, the writing does not appear to be the complete embodiment of
the terms relating to the subject matter of the writing. '1 48 In Mellon Bank,
N.A., v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., the Third Circuit explained that
[T]he issue of 'integration'... arises when evidence is introduced
to vary or add to the unambiguous written terms of a contract on
the ground that the evidence is admissible because the written
contract is not fully integrated. The issue becomes whether the
144. See id.
145. This analysis corresponds to Eric Posner's description of the "soft" approach to the
parol evidence rule, which determines that a writing is complete only when extrinsic
evidence is consistent with that view. See Posner, supra note 101, at 535. For example, in
Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178,
1183 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit ruled that a document for the sale of goods was
integrated after considering and rejecting evidence such as complaints about the quality of
the goods, information concerning trips that led to the signing of the document, and oral
testimony concerning the negotiations and related correspondence. For a commentary on
the Fifth Circuit's analysis of this problem, see Dow, supra note 101.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (stating that "agreements and
negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in
evidence to establish (a) that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement"); see also
JOHN EDWARD MuRRAY JR., CONTRACTS § 105 (2d ed. 1974); Calamari & Perillo, supra
note 101, at 343; Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search
for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REv. 643, 648 (1995); Lawrence, supra
note 139, at 1071; Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 1396 (describing the
clear influence of Corbin's thought on recent decisions). But see Ralph James Mooney, The
New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REv. 1131, 1133 (1995) (arguing that
during the late 1980s and 1990s, a return to classical conceptualist thinking emerged in
parol evidence cases).
147. See, e.g., Harden v. Warner AmEx Cable Communication Inc., No. 83 CIV.
91594PCL, 1985 WL 3402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1985) (stating that extrinsic evidence is
also admissible to prove whether the parties assented to a particular writing as constituting
the complete and accurate integration of their contract).
148. Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Toys "R" Us, 906 F.2d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 1990).
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proffered evidence is extrinsic to the integrated written contract,
and thus inadmissible, or whether the proffered evidence is part
and parcel of the entire contract of which the written document is
only a part. 49
Corbin believed that courts often neglected to examine whether a
written contract was integrated.' 50 Even when courts did consider the
question of integration, they often failed to analyze whether the document
was partially or fully integrated.' Proceeding to contract interpretation
without analyzing whether the contract is integrated or assuming a contract
is integrated without analyzing available extrinsic evidence could lead to
the enforcement of contracts that do not contain the correct expression of
all of the terms of the parties' agreement.
B. Contract Interpretation
At the heart of many contract disputes lies the issue of contract
interpretation. This is the second area in which courts must consider the
role of extrinsic evidence. 2 If integration answers the question, "[a]re we
looking at the right words?" then contract interpretation responds to the
question, "[w]hat do these words mean?"'153 In resolving contract disputes,
this is a much more difficult issue for a written opinion to dismiss than the
explicit analysis of whether the contract is integrated.
On many points, there is sufficient agreement to offer, with
149. 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). Although the Mellon
Bank court addressed a controversy arising out of the exchange of notes between
commercial lenders rather than ERISA issues, the case has been cited with approval in
numerous ERISA decisions in the Third Circuit.
150. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 101, at § 573 (stating that "[iun hundreds of
cases stating and purporting to apply the 'parol evidence rule,' the reported opinion does not
show the basis of the court's finding (or assumption) that the writing presented in court was
in fact assented to as the complete and final integration of agreement"). The Fifth Circuit
has held that a court must determine whether a document is integrated even if it contains an
express integration clause. See Matthews v. Dow Chem. Corp., 475 F.2d 146, 148-49 (5th
Cir. 1973) (holding that where the issue was raised by the evidence, the court must
determine whether the writing was intended to constitute, and does constitute, a complete
integration of the agreement between the parties; additionally, in so doing, the court may not
apply the parol evidence rule).
151. See Dow, supra note 101, at 618-20.
152. Judge Posner, for example, has opined that in interpreting contractual obligations, it
would be "passing odd" to prohibit the consultation of dictionaries, treatises, articles, and
other published materials created by strangers to the dispute. Additionally, he advocates
examining trade usage. See Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Unofficial Comm. of 13 1/2%
Noteholders of Envirodyne Indus., Inc., (In re Envirodyne), 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir.
1994) (Posner, C.J.).
153. Murray, supra note 101, at 343 (stating that the parol evidence rule will determine
whether the parties intended their final writings to be integrated).
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confidence, some precepts reminiscent of hornbook law. Although the
purpose of contract interpretation is to enforce the intent of the parties, the
written contract, as the "strongest external sign of agreement between
contracting parties," is the lodestar of contract interpretation.5 4 The courts
commonly state that a document that is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation is ambiguous as a matter of law. 15* It is well accepted that a
party may offer extrinsic evidence to illustrate the meaning of ambiguous
contract provisions.1 56 Additionally, extrinsic evidence may not contradict
the plain terms of an unambiguous document.
157
However, of greater controversy is whether and to what extent a court
should consider extrinsic evidence in making an initial determination of
ambiguity.' 58 In order to introduce extrinsic evidence that may be useful in
interpreting a contract, a litigant must first demonstrate that the contract at
issue is ambiguous as a matter of law. 5 9 Courts are again divided between
whether this analysis should be based on the 'four comers' of the writing or
154. See generally Murray, supra note 101, at 1342 (stating that the written
manifestation of assent is not the contract, but merely evidence of the contract). See, e.g.,
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1009 (stating that "courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining
the parties' subjective intent and instead bind parties by the objective manifestations of their
intent"); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1971) (explaining that the
function of contract interpretation is "to ascertain the intention of the parties as manifested
by the words they used to evidence their agreement").
155. See Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d
1227, 1232 (3d. Cir. 1991).
156. Some states recognize a distinction between "patent" and "latent" ambiguities. A
patent ambiguity exists on the face of the contract, while a latent ambiguity emerges from
examination of extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Wiener v. East Arkansas Planting Co., 975
F.2d 1350, 1356 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing an Arkansas law recognizing the patent/latent
distinction).
157. See, e.g., Matthews v. Dow Chem. Corp., 475 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that although the introduction of parol evidence was appropriate to determine
whether the document was integrated, it was error to allow parol evidence to alter the terms
of or add inconsistent provisions to a written contract); In re Envirodyne 29 F.3d at 3015
(holding that the object of excluding extrinsic evidence when the contract is clear on its
surface is "to prevent parties from trying to slip out of their clearly stated, explicitly
assumed contractual obligations through self-serving testimony or documents ... purporting
to show that the parties didn't mean what they said in the written contract").
It is worth noting that in Ortman, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Illinois law to permit
the admission of extrinsic evidence in order to explain the meaning of a written instrument
when there was no finding of ambiguity. See Ortman 437 F.2d at 235. However, in 1984,
the Seventh Circuit noted that Illinois law had been clarified and that the holding of Ortman
was no longer an accurate statement of the law. See Sunstream Jet Express, Inc. v.
International Air Serv. Co., Ltd., 734 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1984).
158. See generally The Interpretation of Words, supra note 101, at 164-70 (analyzing the
possibility that the word "chicken" may be shown to be ambiguous if extrinsic evidence is
considered).
159. See Taylor, 933 F.2d at 1234; Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376
(6th Cir. 1994); Boyer v. Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999, 1005 (6th Cir. 1993).
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on extrinsic evidence.
1 60
In many respects, the 'four comers' approach is advantageous in
161analyzing ambiguity because it facilitates judicial economy and clarity.
Therefore, many courts require that a litigant demonstrate that a contract is
ambiguous without the use of extrinsic evidence. 62 However, for all its
simplicity the 'four comers' approach has been criticized for its ingenuous
assumption that words clearly express intent. As Wigmore stated:
The truth had finally to be recognized that words always need
interpretation; that the process of interpretation inherently and
invariably means the ascertainment of the association between
words and external objects; and that this makes inevitable a free
resort to extrinsic matters for applying and enforcing the
document .... Once freed from the primitive formalism which
views the document as a self-contained and self-operative
formula, we can fully appreciate the modem principle that the
words of a document are never anything but indices to extrinsic
things, and that therefore all the circumstances must be
considered which go to make clear the sense of the words-that
is, their association with things. 63
Borrowing from criticisms voiced by legal realists earlier this
century,164 the Third Circuit warned that judges who decline to admit
extrinsic evidence may apply their own subjective experience to the 'four
160. Again, Eric Posner's delineation of the "hard" and "soft" approaches to the parol
evidence rule are pertinent. A court that takes a "hard" approach to the analysis of parol
evidence will generally decline to examine extrinsic evidence when determining whether an
ambiguity is present. A court that takes a "soft" approach may decide that a document that
does not contain an ambiguity on its face may nonetheless be ambiguous if the extrinsic
evidence suggests that the parties agreed on terms that are inconsistent with the written
document. See Posner, supra note 101, at 535. In its discussion of Pennsylvania law in
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit Corp., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980), the
Third Circuit drew a distinction between the 'four comers' approach and its preferred
method of considering all relevant extrinsic evidence.
Under a 'four comers' approach, a judge sits in chambers and determines from
his point of view whether the written words before him are ambiguous. An
alternative approach is for the judge to hear the proffer of the parties and
determine if there is objective indicia that, from the linguistic reference point of
the parties, the terms of the contract are susceptible of differing meanings.
161. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 353.
162. See, e.g., Schachner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 77 F.3d 889, 893 (6th
Cir. 1996); Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 702 (11th Cir. 1993). See
generally Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the "Four
Corners" to Parol Evidence (And Everything in Between), 69 MIss. L.J. 73, 87 (1999)
(describing the use of the 'four comers' approach in Mississippi).
163. 9 RALPH J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2470 (3d ed. 1940), cited in
Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231, 235 n.235 (7th Cir. 1971).
164. See Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011.
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comers' interpretation. 16 In his famous opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc.,166 Chief Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court argued that the fact that a judge perceives
a document to have a certain meaning "does not preclude the possibility
that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different
terms.
1 67
Likewise, Corbin argued that a court cannot possibly determine
whether a particular provision of a contract is unambiguous without
considering extrinsic evidence. 16' The classic example of the importance of
extrinsic evidence is, of course, the case of the contract for the shipment of
goods on the vessel named Peerless.69 Although the contract appeared to
be accurate, the extrinsic evidence unveiled the ambiguity when it became
165. See id. at 1010.
166. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
167. Id. at 645.
168. See The Interpretation of Words, supra note 101, at 161 ("When a court makes the
often repeated statement that the written words are so plain and clear and unambiguous that
they need no interpretation and that evidence is not admissible, it is making an interpretation
on the sole basis of the extrinsic evidence of its own linguistic experience and education, of
which it merely takes judicial notice."); Id. at 189.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.
1971) is an excellent example of this approach. Citing Corbin, Wigmore on Evidence, and
the Restatement of Contracts § 238, Chief Judge Swygert explains that the parol evidence
rule does not require a court to make an initial determination that a contract is ambiguous
before considering extrinsic evidence. The court notes the inconsistencies in the precedents
interpreting Illinois state law (as the concurrence pointed out, particularly in the area of
insurance law). The majority nonetheless concluded that:
[R]elevant parol evidence is always admissible to assist in the determination of
what the words used in an integrated writing mean; and the parol evidence rule
is placed in its proper role of focusing interpretation on the meaning of the
terms embodied in the writing and of rendering all evidence inoperative to vary
those terms once their meaning has been discovered.
437 F.2d at 235. Senior Circuit Judge Hastings' concurring opinion suggests that the effect
of this broad statement of the parol evidence rule would be to "abrogate the parol evidence
rule and proscribe the use of parol evidence only for the purpose of changing the writing."
Id. at 237. In fact, this seems to be the very point that Corbin made in his treatise on
contracts. Ortman was later overruled with respect to the idea that extrinsic evidence may
always be admitted to interpret contracts regardless of ambiguity. See Sunstrealn Jet
Express v. InternationalAir Serv., 734 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1984).
This analysis has been adopted by a number of courts. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981) (determining that evidence of surrounding
circumstances may be consulted in order to determine whether or not a contract is
ambiguous). This case provides that a court may confine its inquiry to the written document
itself "[i]f, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the language of the contract appears to
be capable of only a single meaning." Id. at 731.
169. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), cited in
Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994).
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apparent that there were, in fact, two ships of the same name.
7
0
Led by criticisms like those made by Wigmore and Corbin, some
courts have thus rejected the 'four comers' approach in favor of the liberal
introduction of extrinsic evidence.17 ' The Seventh Circuit has noted that
although extrinsic evidence may not be used to create an ambiguity, a
litigant may rely on extrinsic evidence, such as books, treatises and other
objective information to demonstrate that an ambiguity exists.172 Following
this approach, evidence of prior communications between the parties may
be admitted to shed light on whether a document is ambiguous. 173  In
Pacific Gas, for example, the court determined that appropriate extrinsic
evidence should include testimony as to circumstances surrounding the
making of the agreement, including consideration of the object, the nature,
and the subject matter of the writing.174
Corbin's approach, however, is not without criticism. In particular,
courts that are generous in their approach to extrinsic evidence may err in
their determination concerning whether a particular provision really is part
of the contract. 75 David Charny has suggested, for example, that the
Corbinian approach adopted by Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas places too
much faith in a judge's ability to sift through the meaning of the extrinsic
evidence.176 Chamy argues that there is no guarantee that the judge will
have a greater insight into the meaning of the extrinsic evidence than she
will into the meaning of the contractual terms themselves. 177 In other
words, the arguments offered against the 'four comers' approach may
eventually and logically be extended as criticisms of the evaluation of the
extrinsic evidence. Moreover, as Eric Posner has recently observed, it is
conceivable that the parties to a contract may indeed have determined that
extrinsic evidence should play no part in the interpretation of their
agreement. Arguing that California had "turned its back on the notion
that a contract can ever have a plain meaning discernible by a court without
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Sunstream Jet Express v. International Air Serv. Co., 734 F.2d 1258 (7th
Cir. 1984) (admitting extrinsic evidence for alternative meanings of the term "engine");
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980) (opting for
determination of objective indicia of evidence for alternative meanings of the contract).
172. See Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1995)
(suggesting that "although extrinsic evidence can be used to show that a contract is
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to create an ambiguity").
173. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc.,
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
174. See id. at 645.
175. See Posner, supra note 101, at 542.
176. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1830 (1991).
177. See id.
178. See Posner, supra note 101, at 571.
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resort[ing] to extrinsic evidence," one federal judge has observed that "it
matters not how clearly a contract is written, nor how completely it is
integrated, nor how carefully it is negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses
the issue before the court: the contract cannot be rendered impervious to
attack by parol evidence.' 7 In other words, a permissive application of the
parol evidence rule may ignore the fact that the parties themselves may
have actually contracted for a narrow application of the parol evidence rule.
Regardless of whether one favors Corbin's flexible approach to
extrinsic evidence or inclines toward a more formalistic approach, it is hard
to ignore the impact that this debate has had on the development of contract
law in the twentieth century. Reduced to its most basic elements, the
debate simply asks whether the fact that a writing exists is enough to
assume that the terms it contains are the terms of the contract. Professors
Calamari and Perillo characterized the debate between Corbin and
Williston and their contemporaries as follows:
[I]s the public better served by giving effect to the parties' entire
agreement, written and oral, even at the risk of injustice caused
by the possibility of perjury and the possibility that superseded
documents will be treated as operative, or does the security of
transactions require that, despite occasional injustices, persons
adopting a formal writing be required, on the penalty of voidness
of their oral and written side agreements, to put their entire
agreement in the formal writing?8
I suspect that few theorists would argue that our understanding of
contract law is the worse for having engaged in this debate. It remains to
be seen whether ERISA jurisprudence can sustain the same discussion.
III. USE OF PAROL EVIDENCE IN RETIREE HEALTH PLAN LITIGATION
Before considering the role that extrinsic evidence should play in the
construction of a retiree health insurance plan, it seems prudent to examine
some fundamental canons of ERISA law. First, as is well known, ERISA's
broad preemption clause stymies most efforts to advance a theory of
liability that is primarily based on state law."8' This is equally true with
respect to theories of contract interpretation 12 Second, ERISA itself
179. Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988),
discussed in Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There is a Parol Evidence Rule
in California - the Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1995)
(analyzing subsequent California case law and determining that the parol evidence rule is in
effect in California).
180. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 101, at 341.
181. For articles discussing the principles of ERISA preemption, see supra note 12.
182. See id.
PROMISES, PROMISES
contains few prescriptions with respect to welfare benefit plans. In
particular, ERISA does not require welfare benefits, including retiree health
benefits, to be vested.'83 Thus, an employer can only be required to provide
those benefits if he has promised to do so.
The combination of a broad preemption of state law and what may be
described, in all generosity, as a fragmentary set of statutory directives has
encouraged courts to develop federal common law to fill substantive and
interpretive needs. Since the statute is vague, at best, on most of the
obligations that might be regarded as essential components of an employer-
sponsored health benefit plan, diligence and creativity are required in order
to determine exactly what benefits an employer has agreed to provide to his
employees and retirees and what limitations apply to those benefits. In this
quest, courts have noted, with apparent relief, that ERISA requires
promises of employee benefits to be memorialized in a written plan
document.'i ' While the preemption of state law, the failure to mandate
vested health benefits, and the development of the federal common law of
ERISA may be murky, the requirement of a written plan document is
clear. 5 The construction of many retiree health plans turns on this point.
The written plan document rule and its effect on the management of
extrinsic evidence in litigation concerning retiree health benefits are thus
the focus of the remainder of this article.
18 6
Section 402(a)(1) of ERISA provides that "[e]very employee benefit
plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument."'' 87  The legislative history of Section 402(a)(1) indicates
Congress' concern that unwritten promises were too difficult to enforce. 8'
Hence, Congress required employers to put the terms of their plan
documents in writing.'89
The requirement of a written plan document has appeal for many
reasons and ERISA's "emphatic preference" for written plan documents is
183. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3), cited in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S. 73, 75 (1995).
184. See ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
185. See STAFF OF SENATE COMMrIrEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93RD CONG.,
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 29 (Comm. Print 1974); see also S. REP.
No. 93-1090, at 297 (reproducing S. REP. No. 1090 (2d Sess. 1974), 120 CONG. RECORD
H8217, H8284 (1974).
186. There are, of course, many other theories that address this problem, including, for
example, arguments based on promissory or equitable estoppel. While these theories are
related to the management of extrinsic evidence, this article does not attempt to deal with
them except in so far as these claims depend upon evidence of an extrinsic nature.
187. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
188. See supra text (legislative history) accompanying note 186.
189. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 83 (describing the written plan document rule
as one of ERISA's "core functional requirements").
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widely remarked. 9 ° First, and foremost, in a statute that is at times opaque,
the requirement of a written plan document is plain. Second, the focus on
the writings that constitute a plan arguably fosters predictability in the
relationship between plan sponsor and plan participant in a manner that
jibes neatly with the statute's goal of protecting employee benefits. 9' As
the Joint Committee Report states:
[E]very covered employee benefit plan (both retirement and
welfare plan) is to be established and maintained in writing. A
written plan is to be required in order that every employee may,
on examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his
rights and obligations are under the plan. Also a written plan is
required so the employees may know who is responsible for
operating the plan. 92
This simple rule offers much protection to employees who can now
see their promised employee benefits in writing. Promises that were once
spoken are now written and employees can wave a plan document in the
face of an employer who claims that the benefits it describes are not
available.
Yet, twenty-six years after ERISA was enacted, it is also clear that the
written plan document rule protects employers from an employee's claim
that benefits were promised but never written down. According to
conventional wisdom, ERISA's requirement of a written plan document
means that a plan sponsor must memorialize commitments that exceed
ERISA's minimum requirements in writing. 93 In this vein, some courts
have held that a plan document's silence on a particular issue is not by itself
sufficient to bind the plan sponsor to commitments outside the scope of
ERISA's minimum requirements. 94 Courts have not had to stretch this
190. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
that ERISA prefers written documents).
191. See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
idea that the goal of protecting employees would be undermined if oral modifications were
permitted because employees would not be able to rely on plan documents).
192. See supra note 185.
193. For an example of a court's reliance on this proposition, see Wise v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Cinelli v. Security Pac. Co., 61 F.3d 1437,
1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining that contractual agreements for vesting of welfare
benefits must be found in plan documents); Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., Inc., 35 F.3d 85 1,
857 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[als a matter of statutory policy, ERISA places great
weight on the written terms of the formal plan documents"); Alday v. Container Corp. of
Am., 906 F.2d 660, 665 (1lth Cir. 1990) (finding that a retiree's right to lifetime medical
benefits can only be upheld if it is found in the terms of the written plan document).
194. See, e.g., Wise, 986 F.2d at 938 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating, "[w]hile clear and
unambiguous statements in the summary plan description are binding, the same is not true
of silence"). But see Murphy v. Keystone Steel and Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 565 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding that although courts presume that benefits do not vest if a contract is silent on
the issue, the presumption can be rebutted by extrinsic evidence).
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conclusion too far to conclude that promises that are not written in the plan
document itself are not valid components of the employee benefit plan.
195
Gradually, ERISA's mandate of a written plan document has come to
justify the assertion that the written plan document embodies the entire
plan. 196  The judiciary's defense of ERISA's "emphatic preference" for
written plan documents clearly strives toward this end.
1 97
If written documents reliably marked the terms of ERISA plans, then
this analysis might be on target. In a perfect world, a plan document would
always clearly state the terms of an employee benefit plan. Yet courts
frequently face litigants who claim that the benefits they were promised are
not those that they received. In reality, employers also communicate
promises of benefits to employees through informal communications and
employees respond to and rely on these communications."' It is a rare
occasion indeed when an employee has an opportunity to comment or
reflect upon a draft of a formal written plan document.1 99 Moreover, some
scholars have suggested that employees often do not know or do not
understand the written documentation of the terms of the benefits that are
offered to them.2 In the "real world," therefore, it seems to be simply
futile to try to determine whether any written document accurately
describes the terms and conditions of an ERISA plan without considering
extrinsic evidence of informal communications.
To date, ERISA jurisprudence lacks a workable and consistent method
to determine whether a plan document properly reflects an employer's
promises to vest retiree health benefits. It is my opinion that the theories
which Corbin advanced to explain the interpretation of parol evidence are
particularly apt tools for this analysis. In order to forward this view, I first
195. See, e.g., UAW Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139 (3d Cir.
1999) (arguing that the vesting of welfare benefits should not be inferred lightly and must be
stated in clear and express language); Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960 (finding that ERISA's
requirement of a written plan document precludes oral modifications of employee benefit
plans and the use of estoppel theories of recovery).
196. See, e.g., Nachvalter, 805 F.2d at 960.
197. See, e.g., Degan, 869 F.2d at 895.
198. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
199. See, e.g., Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1355 (S.D. Miss.
1994) (determining that the responsibility for reducing the plan to writing is not that of the
employee or beneficiary, but is rather the responsibility of the employer or insurance
company). See generally LANGBEIN AND WOLK, supra note 4, at 204 (noting that in plans
that are not the result of collective bargaining, employees are less likely to have input into
plan drafting).
The fact that an employee rarely is part of the drafting process has also contributed to
the adoption of the rule of contra proferentem as part of the federal common law of ERISA
in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir.
1993); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1993).
200. See generally Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, supra note 32, at
1618; Fisk, Lochner Redux, supra note 15.
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examine the role that the written plan document rule plays in cases in
which there is no plan document in order to illuminate the role it should
play when there is a written plan document. Next, I examine the meaning
of the written plan document rule in the cases in which there is a written
plan document and offer the suggestion that a flexible understanding of the
concepts of integration and interpretation would enhance our ability to
accurately assess the use of the written plan document.
A. The Written Plan Document Rule
By stating that an ERISA plan must be maintained pursuant to a
written instrument, Section 402 of ERISA naturally invites comparison to
the statute of frauds and its various statutory cousins.2 1 Indeed, on the
surface, the goals of the common law statute of frauds seem somewhat
similar to the stated purposes of ERISA. The statute of frauds was
intended to clarify the nature of certain types of contracts2 2 and to prevent
the enforcement of fraudulent allegations of an oral agreement. 203 While
courts have been troubled by the fact that the statute of frauds may cause
"honest men [to] lose the benefit of their bargains because they neglected to
reduce them to writing,,2 04 the statute of frauds imposes on both parties the
burden to make the effort to memorialize the contract or to live with the
consequences.
Any such characterization of Section 402 of ERISA, however, would
ignore the fact that Section 402 is part of ERISA's fiduciary provisions.05
The fiduciary provisions of ERISA are designed to protect employees by
206requiring employers to maintain a plan document. They are not designed
201. For an example of state law statute of frauds, see U.C.C. § 2-201 (1999); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1624 (West 2000) (stating, "[t]he following contracts are invalid, unless the
same... [is] in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged .... ); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
25:1-5 (West 1999) ("No action shall be brought upon any of the following agreements or
promises, unless the agreement or promise... shall be in writing ....").
202. Note that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 1, § 20, makes it
clear that a writing is only necessary to enforce an inter vivos trust when it is required by a
statute of frauds. Thus, the old saying, "get it in writing" only applies when the legislature
has decided to make it so. Most states have enacted a statute of frauds with respect to inter
vivos trusts holding interests in land. In a few states, a writing is also required in order to
enforce an inter vivos trust for the transfer of personal property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 20 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-23
(West 2000).
203. See generally Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 1422-37 (noting
that the statute of frauds managed to curb the power of juries).
204. Lovely v. Dierkes, 347 N.W.2d 752,755 (Mich. App. 1984).
205. The written plan document rule appears in the provisions setting forth the
obligations of a fiduciary under ERISA.
206. See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that "it
would be incongruous for persons establishing or maintaining informal or unwritten
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to force employees to hold the employer's pen to paper to make sure that
plan documents are written.2 7 Moreover, they should not be implemented
in a manner that enables employers to back out of oral commitments that
they have not bothered to memorialize in a plan document.208 Thus, the
fiduciary character of Section 402 must overpower the temptation to
characterize this provision as a mere statute of frauds.
The difference between contemporary legislative formulations of the
statute of frauds in contract law and the language of Section 402 of ERISA
highlights this point. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a statute
of frauds as a provision that states that "all declarations or creations of
trusts of land shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the
party who is by law enabled to declare such a trst... or else they shall be
utterly void and of none effect."2 ' 9 Inherent in this conception of the statute
of frauds are two elements: the requirement of a writing and a statement
that failure to comply with a writing will render the trust unenforceable.210
In other words, the statute of frauds commonly links the ability to enforce
the contract to compliance with the writing requirement. When state
legislatures draft a statute of frauds, they often state that a contract will not
be valid or cannot be the basis of an action unless the contract is in writing.
Consider, for example, Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which is surely one of the most permissive formulations of the statute of
frauds in operation today. Section 2-201(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
employee benefit plans, or assuming the responsibility of safeguarding plan assets, to
circumvent the Act merely because an administrator or other fiduciary failed to satisfy
reporting or fiduciary standards"); see also Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Company, 871 F.2d
1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The policy behind the 'written instrument' clause is to prevent
collusive or fraudulent side agreements between employers and employees. But for the
'written instrument' clause, employees [sic] could discriminate in favor of certain plan
participants to the detriment of others.").
207. See, e.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372 (discussing the idea that ERISA's coverage
provision reaches any employee benefit plan, regardless of whether it is formal or written).
208. See id.;
Roger C. Siske & Joni L. Andrioff, Selected Topics in ERISA Preemption, C758 ALI-ABA
45, 66-67 (1992).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 40 (1959).
210. For a discussion of the effect of characterizing a trust or contract that fails to
comply with the statute of frauds as unenforceable, rather than void, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 24 cmt. A, illus. 18 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 146 cmt. b.
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sought or by his authorized agent or broker.zn
Thus, the Uniform Commercial Code, which is willing to accept "lead
pencil on a scratch pad"212 as the writing itself, clearly sets out the
consequences for failing to produce a writing: the contract is "not
enforceable by way of action or defense. 213 The California Civil Code
similarly explains in its statute of frauds that "[t]he following contracts are
invalid, unless the same... is in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged .... ,,214 Likewise, New Jersey provides that "[n]o action shall be
brought upon any of the following agreements or promises, unless the
agreement or promise... shall be in writing .... 215 While there are many
formulations of the statute of frauds, each of these examples illustrates the
manner in which the legislature has gone beyond simply stating the
requirement that a writing be used and instead stated the consequences of
failing to comply with the requirement of a writing.
This is a very different approach from the requirements of Section
402(a)(1) of ERISA, which simply provides that "[e]very employee benefit
plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument., 216 While this language does mandate the establishment of a
written plan document, it does not by its terms state that an unwritten plan
will be invalid or that an action cannot be brought on the basis of an
217unwritten plan. It simply says that a written instrument must be
established.
If Section 402 were indeed to be considered a statute of frauds, then
many of the seminal cases of ERISA jurisprudence that recognize
unwritten or "informal" plans would have to be overturned and their
participants cast adrift without the protections of the statute. That an
ERISA plan can exist despite the absence of a formal plan document is
218widely accepted. In its seminal opinion in Donovan v. Dillingham, the
211. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (emphasis added).
212. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1.
213. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1982).
215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West 1999).
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
217. See generally Ford, Broken Promises, supra note 28, at 444 n.69 ("[A]ithough
ERISA requires plans to be in writing, this is not part of the definition of the word 'plan').
218. See Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a plan
need not be written); Deibler v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Local Union 23,
973 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1992) (deciding that the word plan does not imply a writing);
Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding that a formal document is not required to prove than an ERISA plan exists);
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11 th Cir. 1982) (finding that ERISA does not
require a formal written plan); see also Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324,
1330 (S.D. Miss. 1994) ("There need be no formal document designated as 'the Plan' to
establish that an ERISA plan exists.").
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Eleventh Circuit distinguished the establishment of an employee benefit
plan from the requirement that such a plan be maintained pursuant to a
written instrument.21 9 According to Dillingham, the establishment of an
employee benefit plan is the act that decisively brings a plan within
ERISA's purview, while Section 402(a)'s requirement that a plan document
be established and maintained is simply a requirement imposed on the plan
administrator and fiduciaries once ERISA claims the plan as within its
coverage.220
The Dillingham facts furnish but one example of the circumstances in
which an employer might find that it had established an employee plan
without having complied with the formalities necessary to satisfy Congress'
mandate that such a plan be maintained pursuant to a written instrument.
In Dillingham, for example, several small employers formed a multiple
employer trust that negotiated for favorable group health insurance rates
221
and purchased health insurance once those rates were established.
Although the employers did not bother to draft a plan document or,
apparently, to distribute a summary plan description, the court concluded
that a plan existed.222 In some cases, the amount and the nature of written
material that describes the plan may be very slight. For example, corporate
memoranda describing an employer's expectations of management when
describing and implementing severance policies have formed the basis of
an ERISA plan.223  Another employer who memorialized a retirement
arrangement in a letter to a former employee was also found to have
224established a plan. Courts have discerned the existence of a plan even
when there is no written documentation at all. For instance, an employer
who maintained an unwritten practice of continuing payments in lieu of
salary for several weeks following an involuntary severance from
employment was considered to be the sponsor of an employee benefit
plan.225
In marking the paradox of an unwritten or "informal" employee
benefit plan, the Dillingham decision and its progeny have endowed the
219. See Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 1370, 1373-75.
222. The subscribers apparently executed "participation agreements" that acknowledged
their fulfillment of collectively bargained obligations. See id. at 1374 n.13. In addition, the
court noted that both the subscribers and the participants "looked to the group health
insurance policy and insurer to determine the eligibility requirements to receive benefits and
'all other terms, conditions, limitations, restrictions, and provisions applicable to a policy of
group insurance."' Id. at 1374.
223. See Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (subjecting a
severance pay plan to ERISA's requirements).
224. See Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540, 1547 (11th Cir. 1991).
225. See Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
existence of a written document is not a prerequisite for ERISA coverage).
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written plan document rule with meaning.22' First, and most importantly,
the Dillingham court was concerned with the reality of a plan's existence.
Thus, an employer's mere intention to establish a plan, without the
implementation of the plan itself, is not enough to determine that a plan
exists.227 A similar theme emerges from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,22s which marked the presence of an
ongoing administrative scheme as a critical element in establishing the
existence of an ERISA plan. A desire to implement benefits or a statutory
mandate to pay benefits, without the support of evidence of ongoing
implementation, is not enough to establish that an employee benefit plan
229exists.
Second, it is not necessary for an employer to comply with a written
plan document rule in order to maintain an employee benefit plan. Thus,
for the Dillingham court, the written plan document rule plays a significant
role in informing plan participants of their rights, but executing a written
plan document is not the sole means of establishing such rights.230 The
existence of a welfare plan depends on the presence of the now famous
Dillingham factors: "[A] 'plan, fund, or program' under ERISA is
established if from the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can
ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of
financing, and procedures for receiving benefits. '23 1 These factors, and
thus an employee benefit plan, may be present even when a written plan
document is not.
Third, Dillingham suggests that compliance with the written plan
document rule is an essential fiduciary function.232 When the Dillingham
factors suggest the presence of an employee benefit plan, however, the
absence of a written plan document indicates a failure to adhere to
226. Dillingham has been specifically adopted by the Third Circuit. See Henglein v.
Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits For Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d 391, 399 (3d
Cir. 1992) (using Dillingham to determine whether an informal plan existed).
227. See Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372-73; Cinelli v. Security Pac. Corp., 61 F.3d 1437,
1443-44 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a board resolution that enables the establishment of a
plan, but does not undertake to authorize the creation of a plan, is not a plan amendment or a
plan document and does not fit the Dillingham criteria for the establishment of an informal
plan); Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that a letter from an employer did not constitute a plan within ERISA). Similarly, the lack
of an intention to establish a plan does not necessarily mean that a plan does not exist if the
requisite factors are present.
228. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
229. See Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372.
230. See id. at 1372-73.
231. Id. at 1373; see also Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d
236, 241 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying the Dilingham rule); Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins., 847 F.
Supp. 1324, 1330 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (adopting the Dillingham rule).
232. See Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372.
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fiduciary standards.233 It does not indicate the absence of a plan.24  In
marking the distinction between the establishment of a plan and the
execution of a written plan document, the Dillingham court stated:
[B]ecause the policy of ERISA is to safeguard the well-being and
security of working men and women and to apprise them of their
rights and obligations under any employee benefit plan... , it
would be incongruous for persons establishing or maintaining
informal or unwritten employee benefit plans, or assuming the
responsibility of safeguarding plan assets, to circumvent the Act
merely because an administrator or other fiduciary failed to
satisfy reporting or fiduciary standardsY 5
In this vein, the written plan document rule is a tool to insure that
fiduciaries communicate the terms of the plan and to help fiduciaries and
participants understand what it means to adhere to those terms.
2 1
6
These insights have obvious consequences for the analysis of the
probative value of a plan document. In recognizing that a plan might exist
even in the absence of a formal plan document, the Dillingham court found
it necessary to rely upon the evidence that was not incorporated in a written
plan document.
In determining whether a plan, fund or program (pursuant to a writing
or not) is a reality, a court must determine whether from the surrounding
circumstances a reasonable person could ascertain the intended benefits,
beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.
237
Thus, the "surrounding circumstances" were of deep significance to
the court's conclusion that a plan existed. Moreover, the Dillingham court,
and many others in the years since, have been more than willing to enforce
a plan if these criteria were met.23s Dillingham stands, therefore, as a
fundamental critique of the equation of Section 402(a) with the common
law statute of frauds. Clearly, if Dillingham is correct, the existence of a
written plan document is not a prerequisite to enforcement of an ERISA
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 1373.
238. Many courts have adopted the Dillingham factors as an indication of whether a plan
exists. See, e.g., Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993); Memorial
Hosp. System, 904 F.2d at 241; Suggs, 847 F. Supp. at 1330. However, there are some
courts that have adopted different tests for the presence of an employee benefit plan. In
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 502 (Utah App. 1992), for example, the Court of
Appeals of Utah declined to follow the Dillingham test and instead concluded that the extent
of employer involvement in the administration and maintenance of the plan is of critical
importance in determining the existence of an employee benefit plan. However, it is
noteworthy that the Robertson court did not quarrel with Dillingham's assertion that a
written plan document is not a prerequisite to finding the existence of a plan.
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plan.
239
This line of reasoning is all the more compelling when one considers
that employers often serve as the fiduciaries of their own employee benefit
plans; in ERISA parlance, they "wear two hats. 2 40  In many instances,
particularly when the economy is booming, an employer may theoretically
experience an identity of interests with his employees. The happier and
241more productive the employees, the happier and richer the employer.
However, the fact that an employer may assume his fiduciary duty to act in
the best interest of the participants with little difficulty during times of
prosperity does not hide the potential for adversarial relations when the
economic picture is not so rosy.
242
By making compliance with the written plan document rule an
explicitly fiduciary function, Congress forestalled any query as to whether
prudent fiduciaries would differ on the necessity of plan documentation.
Congress did not state, however, that a writing was necessary to
demonstrate the existence of an ERISA plan.
B. The Written Plan Document Rule and Extrinsic Evidence
Dillingham allowed participants in an employee benefit plan to assert
their rights under ERISA even though those rights were not incorporated
into a written plan document. It is singularly ironic that this advantage has
generally not been extended to participants in an employee benefit plan that
actually is set forth in a plan document.24 This is not merely due to the
239. But see Rockney v. Pako Corp., 734 F.Supp. 373, 383 (D. Minn. 1988) (stating that
ERISA does not specifically bar the operation of the statute of frauds and therefore plaintiffs
were barred by the statute of frauds when they sued trustees who did not agree, in writing, to
be personally liable for top-hat plan benefits). This opinion can be distinguished from
Dillingham on a number of grounds: (a) in Rockney, unlike Dillingham, the court's analysis
included a plan document; (b) top-hat plans are exempted from the fiduciary obligations of
ERISA, including the written plan document rule; and (c) the issue in Rockney was the
individual liability of nonsignatory trustees and not the liability of plan sponsors.
240. See, e.g., Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir.
1985) ("ERISA permits employers to wear 'two hats,' and that they assume fiduciary status
'only when and to the extent' that they function in their capacity as plan administrators, not
when they conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA."), abrogated on other grounds
by Mead v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 720 (1989); Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich, 156 F.3d 660, 665
(6th Cir. 1998).
241. See generally Frank P. Vanderploeg, Role-Playing Under ERISA: The Company as
"Employer" and "Fiduciary," 9 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 259 (1997).
242. See generally Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, supra note 32, at
1618-19; Vanderploeg, supra note 241, at 279 ("The decision to terminate a plan ...
presents a clear conflict between the employer's interest and the participants' interests
(which are normally assumed to favor the continuation of the plan).").
243. See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting the
requirement of a written plan document precludes oral modifications).
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simple equation of Section 402 with a statute of frauds, but also because
courts have assumed that the requirement of a written plan document
signifies the exclusion of parol evidence in a manner that goes far beyond
the manner in which commentators such as Corbin prescribe for the
common law. 244 Stated differently, courts have characterized the written
plan document rule as a statutorily imposed integration clause.245 Thus,
courts have seldom examined a written plan document to determine
whether it is, in fact, truly integrated. By extension, under the aegis of the
federal common law of ERISA, courts have found it easy to exclude
extrinsic evidence in many cases other than when ambiguity is patently
evident on the face of the document.
Consider a plan that has actually been memorialized in a writing of
some kind. To a veteran reader of ERISA decisional law, it is hardly
surprising that some consideration must be due to the question of what
246actually constitutes a plan document. In many cases, the employer will
have drafted a plan document that is clearly labeled as such.247 In some
cases, a less zealous employer may rely on an insurance policy as his plan
document.248 In other cases, the summary plan description is the closest
approximation to a plan document.249 In yet another variation, many courts
have begun to regard the "plan documents" as a collection of documents
including the insurance policy (if any), the formal plan document, any trust
instruments, and the summary plan description ("SPD"). 210 The difficulty
244. Even if Section 402 were viewed as a statute of frauds, the concept that a contract
must be in writing in order to be enforceable does not obviate the need for examination of
the document to determine whether it is in fact integrated. A writing might satisfy the
statute of frauds and yet still fail to attain the status of a complete integration. See The
hIterpretation of Words, supra note 101.
245. See, e.g., In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that the
written plan document rule acts as a strong integration clause).
246. See, e.g., Carver v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 1990 WL 169596 (E.D. Wash.
1990), affd, 951 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1222 (1992).
247. But see Negrette v. Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 72 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding that there is no requirement that a plan document be labeled as such in order to be
recognized as controlling document) (citing Horn v. Berdon, Inc. Defined Benefit Pension
Plan, 938 F.2d 125, 127 (9th Cir. 1991) (approving Board resolutions as an amendment to a
defined benefit plan)).
248. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996)
(deciding that in the absence of a formal plan document, insurance contract was the
controlling document); Dague v. Gencorp. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 424, 429 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(using an insurance policy and certificates as the controlling plan documents), affd without
op., 62 F.3d 1417 (6th Cir. 1995).
249. See, e.g., Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 91 (3d. Cir. 1992)
("Because a formal plan document does not exist, our knowledge of the Plan arises from
three summary plan descriptions.").
250. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that SPDs
are to be considered part of the plan document); Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 607 F.
Supp. 196, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that an employee benefit plan under ERISA can be
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which courts face in identifying the plan document, however, does not
necessarily dispose them to regard extrinsic evidence more sympathetically
once they have resolved the question of what constitutes the plan
document.
Once a plan document is determined to be in existence, the traditional
questions of document interpretation must be answered, as well as
questions concerning the role of information extrinsic to that document.
This is as true in ERISA litigation as in any other litigation involving parol
evidence in the interpretation of a contract or trust. In ERISA litigation,
however, deference to the written plan document rule has twisted the way
the issue is framed. In the words of the Third Circuit: "Like any common
law integration clause, [Section 402(a)(1)] makes the plan document the
entire agreement of the parties and bars the introduction of parol evidence
to vary or contradict the written terms." 5' Stated differently, by equating
Section 402(a)(1) with a "strong integration clause,"052 a court that deems a
plan document unambiguous may dismiss parol evidence and refocus the
analysis of the litigants' claims on the words contained in the plan
document. Acknowledging the fiduciary character of the written plan
document rule, however, invites a critical examination of the role that the
rule has played and the role that it ought to play in a court's determination
concerning whether the plan is integrated. Next, similar questions may be
addressed in the context of the admission or exclusion of extrinsic evidence
to determine the existence of an ambiguity. In each case, it is fruitful to
draw a distinction between the manner in which courts have dealt with
collectively bargained plans, which may reflect more traditional methods of
negotiations, and with single-employer plans, which are usually presented
to an employee as afait accompli.
1. Integration
Integration is a term rarely used in ERISA litigation and even more
rare are the instances in which a court self-consciously reflects upon or
reports its analysis of whether a document is integrated. 23  Of course,
integration analysis is not foreign to the analysis of collective bargaining
comprised of more than one document).
251. In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 149.
252. Id.
253. One striking exception is the district court's opinion in Sprague v. General Motors
Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1994), affd, 92 F.3d 1425 (6th Cir.), vacated, 102 F.3d
204 (1996), affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998). The
court examined statements of agreement executed by the company and its early retirees and
concluded that, under the federal common law of ERISA, the agreements were not
integrated. See id. at 301-02. The rarity of this analysis is perhaps reflected in the fact that
the opinion was at first affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, but later was vacated.
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agreements, including those which incorporate references to retiree health
benefit plans. 4 This can perhaps be explained by the simple observation
that collectively bargained plans easily permit a court to identify two
parties who have agreed to the writing that the court is analyzing. Thus,
the traditional questions posed by integration analysis in the common law
setting are more easily translated to plans that are the result of negotiations
between union and employer. Nonetheless, employee benefits that are not
the subject of a collective bargaining agreement should also be considered
as part of the compensation provided in exchange for an employee's labor,
rather than as a gift from the employer to the employees.2 5 In reality,
however, many such plans are drafted and executed by the employer with
256little or no input from employees. Some courts have gone so far as to
characterize certain ERISA plans as unilateral contracts.25 7 This does not
mean, however, that integration analysis is inappropriate in the analysis of
an unbargained plan, but merely that it is uncommon.
Whether one likens an ERISA plan to a contract or a trust, the first
254. See, e.g., Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 565-67 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting existence of an integration clause in a collective bargaining agreement and
interpreting significance of integration clause with respect to plan). See generally Maurer v.
Joy Technologies, Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In interpreting a [collective
bargaining agreement], the intent of both parties to the agreement must be discerned .... ");
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772-73 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct.
1674 (2000) (describing differences in analysis of benefit plans "unilaterally instituted by
the company" and those which are the subject of negotiations between the company and a
union).
255. See Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 6 Sup. CT. REv. 207, 211-12, 226
(1990).
256. See generally, Fisk, LochnerRedux, supra note 15 at 155; See Langbein, supra note
255, at 211-12.; Rossbacher et al., ERISA's Dark Side, supra note 14, at 316. On the
characterization of plans as contracts, see Conison, supra note 15, at 590-97, 609-10, 632-
33.
257. See, e.g., In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 149; Amatuzio v. Gandalf Sys. Corp.,
994 F. Supp. 253 (D.N.J. 1998). See generally Langbein, supra note 255, at 226 ("[M]ost
pension and employee benefit plans are unilateral contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis"). Nor should one assume that an employer has not made representations to
employees before the plan was drafted and that the employees have not relied on those
representations in their continued employment at the company. Moreover, one would be ill-
advised to assume that participants who enroll in a plan have not been induced to participate
in the plan or even to accept employment on the basis of representations concerning the
existence of a certain kind of benefit. Thus, even when an ERISA plan gives the appearance
of being an employer-provided gratuity, to characterize it as a unilateral contract is an
overly simplistic analysis. Moreover, even if this were the case, trust law operates in
conjunction with contract law when matters of parol evidence are concerned, and there is
ample reason to expect that the parol evidence rule, and integration analysis, are equally
applicable in the case of true grantor trusts. See generally, Ethan Lipsig, Are Plan
Documents Still King? A Survey of Recent Unilateral Contract and Inadequate Disclosure
Fiduciary Breach Challenges to Plan Terms, 5 ERISA Lrr. RP=. 21 (1996).
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logical step towards interpretation would seem to be the issue of
integration. Likewise, the first step in contract interpretation is to
determine whether a contract is fully integrated. 58 In some cases, courts
have attempted to ascertain whether a written plan document is fully
integrated.259 In many cases, however, courts seem to assume that the
written plan document rule is equivalent to a presumption of integration.260
Thus, because no integration analysis occurs, there is no opportunity for a
participant to introduce evidence that suggests that the written document
did not fully express the terms of the plan.
Collectively bargained plans bear the closest resemblance to fully
bargained bilateral contracts. Normally, union trustees and employer
representatives negotiate contracts that cover, among other things, a range
261of compensation issues. The fruit of these negotiations is usually a
collective bargaining agreement, which is later supplemented by a formal
262
plan document that expresses the terms of an employee benefit plan.
Now consider the position of an employee who claims that the written
plan document does not adequately express a promise made in the course
of negotiations. Should evidence of this problem be taken into
consideration by the court? A recurring example of this type of dispute
occurs in cases in which union representatives allege that a promise was
made to provide health benefits to retirees for the remainder of their lives,
and the employer counters that the written plan document includes a
reservation of rights clause or other language authorizing it to modify or
terminate the benefit plan.26' In cases involving collectively bargained for
plans, the employer may also argue that the promise of lifetime benefits
264
was intended to last only as long as the collective bargaining agreement.
258. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209, 213 (1981) (defining
an integrated agreement and explaining its effects on prior agreements).
259. See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266, 301-02 (E.D. Mich.
1994).
260. See, e.g., Frank v. Colt Industries, Inc., 910 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1990) (in analyzing a
severance plan, court concludes, "[w]here an employer has created an integrated document
setting forth the terms of a benefit plan, as has happened in the present case, not every
internal document containing a reference to management's interpretation of the plan should
be regarded as a part of the plan itself').
261. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co., Inc. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 1998)
(describing union negotiations for health and life insurance and pension benefits for
employees of Pabst Brewing Company).
262. See, e.g., Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes, 954 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(citing UAW Local No. 134 v. Yard-Man 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Benefits
for retirees are only permissive not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.")).
263. See, e.g., In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 58 F.3d
896, 904 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that a plan can effectively use the word "lifetime" to
describe the duration of benefits while, at the same time, reserving a right to terminate those
benefits).
264. See, e.g., Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 850 F. Supp. 1367, 1373-74 (C.D.
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In some cases involving collectively bargained plans, some sort of
integration analysis that considers extrinsic evidence occurs, at least with
respect to the status of the collective bargaining agreement itself.265 At
minimum, this is appropriate because there is an arms-length bargaining
process between at least two parties; moreover, a merger clause is often
present in such documents, indicating that the parties, or at the very least,
their lawyers have given some thought to the issue.
266
In other cases, however, courts simply gloss over the issue. In Bidlack
v. Wheelabrator Co.,267 for example, the Seventh Circuit examined a
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the parties intended
to vest retirees in their health benefits beyond the duration of the collective
bargaining agreement.268 While Judge Posner's majority opinion noted that
the collective bargaining agreement included an integration clause, his
opinion did not examine whether the agreement truly was integrated and
specifically chose instead to move forward by characterizing the issue as
one of contract interpretation.269 Similarly, in Pabst Brewing Co v. Corrao,
the Seventh Circuit noted, but did not analyze, a severability clause that
touched on the issue of integration. 270
Yet, as we have seen in traditional contract analysis, integration is an
important first question in deciding how far the analysis of parol evidence
may extend.27  In cases involving collectively bargained arrangements, it
seems unfair to exclude extrinsic evidence from the integration analysis. 2
It is important to observe that, in any single instance, the examination of
extrinsic evidence during the course of integration analysis should
Ill. 1994) (finding that the plan language indicates duration of retiree medical plan strictly
coexistent with duration of collective bargaining agreement unless specifically vested in
collective bargaining agreement).
265. But see Bakery and Confectionary Union and Indus. Int'l Pension Fund v. Ralph's
Grocery Co., 118 F.3d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that integration analysis is not
necessary with respect to contributions to multi-employer funds because of the presumption
that collective bargaining agreements and plan documents govern in Section 515 of ERISA).
See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Company, Inc., v. Corrao, 176 F.R.D. 552, 557 (E.D. Wisc. 1997)
(pointing out that "each and every collective bargaining agreement between Pabst and the
union between 1975... [t]hrough 1984 has contained a 'wholly integrated contract' clause
which states that the current agreement 'cancels and takes the place of all previous
agreements'...").
266. See id.
267. 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 608.
270. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1998).
271. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209, 213 (1981).
272. On the application of the parol evidence rule to collective bargaining agreements in
general, see Anthony Carraba, Comment, Merk v. Jewel Food Stores: The Parol Evidence
Rule Applied to Collective Bargaining Agreements-A Trend Toward More Formnality in the
Name of National Labor Policy?, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 719 (1993).
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theoretically be a neutral exercise that should favor neither plaintiff nor
defendant.273 It is by no means clear that in the context of a fully bargained
plan, employers will lose this argument on a regular basis, nor that plaintiff
employees should consistently expect to win it. When great care has been
taken in the drafting of a fully bargained document that contains an
integration clause, there is every reason to hope that the integration clause
is indeed valid and will hold up against examination.274 In some cases, a
court may conclude that the document is not fully integrated. 275 In some
cases, however, a court may determine that the extrinsic evidence is
consistent with a finding that the writing is integrated or, in other cases,
that the evidence itself is not credible.
A court that passes extrinsic evidence through integration analysis
before it decides to exclude that evidence from its analysis of the
agreement may feel that the process did not advance judicial economy or
that the parties have wasted resources in arguing over a point that seemed
self-evident. However, an initial analysis of whether the agreement was
truly integrated may forestall subsequent more spurious arguments over the
impact of extrinsic evidence; more importantly, it will enable the court to
proceed to the analysis of subsequent issues with the firm understanding
that this document is indeed the full expression of the parties' agreement.
When balanced against arguments of economy, principles of fairness ought
to play a role in determining whether courts should decide, rather than
assume, that a document is integrated.
Assuming, rather than deciding, that a plan document contains the
entirety of the plan itself is even more dangerous to principles of fairness
and accuracy when the benefits at issue are not the subject of collective
bargaining. For example, examine the Second Circuit's seminal opinion in
Moore v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 276 a case frequently cited as
authority for the proposition that informal communications may not serve
as the basis of a plan amendment. In Moore, the employer sponsored a
medical benefit plan for its employees and retirees.277 It is not particularly
273. I acknowledge the many trenchant criticisms that have been made about the role
that the legal system itself plays in upholding, if not favoring, the dominant power
structures. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 101. In making this statement, I do not mean to
comment upon the prevailing legal structure, but limit my remarks to the theoretical
advantages that may be gained or lost in a single case. A systematic, structural analysis of
the process may reveal a different story or, perhaps, many different stories refracted through
many different analytical concepts.
274. See, e.g., Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608 (noting that the presence of an integration clause
suggests that the parties want to limit further judicial inquiry).
275. See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266, 301-2 (E.D. Mich.
1994) (finding that retirement agreements did not contain all contract terms so as to be fully
integrated).
276. 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
277. See id. at 489.
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surprising that the employer, a life insurance company, maintained plan
documents which contained provisions that reserved its right to amend or
terminate the plan and, after ERISA was enacted, issued summary plan
descriptions that contained similar language.27 Despite the evident care
with which its documents were drafted, Metropolitan slipped up in its
communications to its employees. Company representatives conducted
presentations and showed filmstrips which described benefits to employees
as being for the employee's lifetime and free of charge.279 After a variety of
plan amendments that raised deductibles, a class of retirees brought suit on
the theory that Metropolitan had breached a unilateral contract with its
280employees, along with a variety of other charges.
The argument put forth by the plaintiffs in Moore did not, per se,
articulate the issue of integration analysis. Their argument, however, stated
that the contract "between themselves and Metropolitan 'consist[ed] of the
totality of the representations made to the employees by the Company, and
the actions of the employees in accepting those representations by
remaining with the Company." '28' In effect, then, the plaintiffs were
charging that the amended plan document was not a total integration.
Two strains of argument were present in the court's response to this
characterization. First, the court argued vigorously that ERISA's
framework depends upon plan's being governed by written plan documents
and summary plan descriptions. 2 To justify its refusal to look outside the
plan documents, the court used an argument based on the need for
predictability in the calculation of future obligations and the specter that
employers might cease to offer such plans.283 To put it more plainly, the
court declined to consider plaintiffs evidence that promises were made in a
form other than the written plan document.2f In other words, the court
refused to examine those documents to make sure that they summarized the
terms of the plan.28
The second strain of argument, buried in a footnote, characterized the
extrinsic evidence issue as a simple case of contract interpretation, rejecting
extrinsic evidence in favor of a clause that seems, to the court, to be plainly
286unambiguous. Thus, in Moore, one may find the rejection of an offer of
extrinsic evidence in both of its classic manifestations: in order to
demonstrate whether the document is integrated and in order to
278. See id. at 489-90.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 491.
281. Id. at 491-92 (quoting plaintiffs' argument).
282. See id. at 492.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 492 n.1.
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demonstrate whether an ambiguity is present.
Even without the direct reference to the term "integration," Moore is
characteristic and clear in its rejection of this tool of contract interpretation
and its cool assumption that Congress has determined that any writing was
superior to the spoken word. Similarly, many ERISA cases seem to be
litigated in the absence of integration analysis. As in Moore, the written
plan document is presumed to be integrated simply because it is in
287writing. Moore itself states plainly that absent a showing of fraud, a plan
that contains a reservation of rights clause will be invulnerable to
challenges that the plan documents do not properly reflect the terms of the
plan as communicated to the participants. 8 Indeed, after perusing cases
like Moore, one could easily conclude that a merger clause, however
sincerely intended, would be superfluous; to paraphrase one ERISA
commentator, Moore and its progeny crowned the plan document king,289
and an absolute monarch, at that.
The Sixth Circuit's struggle to reach a conclusion in the litigation over
the allegations that General Motors had promised lifetime retiree medical
coverage to its salaried retirees demonstrates that the disagreement over
extrinsic evidence exists even within courts. In Sprague v. General Motors
Corp., 29 certain early retirees of General Motors claimed that they had
entered into binding bilateral contracts that provided for the vesting of
health care benefits.291 The early retirees tried to enforce the alleged
contracts as modifications to the employer's general retiree medical plan as
individual ERISA plans and under federal common law theories.292 The
district court originally determined that these agreements were not fully
integrated, and thus permitted the introduction of extrinsic evidence of
General Motors' communications to the employees. 3 Invoking the written
plan document rule, the Sixth Circuit ultimately ruled that the oral
statements did not modify the terms of the written plan.294 Judge Lively's
opinion, which departed from the majority's analysis on this point, noted
that the early retirees had effectively bargained for their enhanced benefits
and that, under these circumstances, the district court had acted properly in
considering evidence beyond the plan documents.29g
287. See, e.g., In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996) (dicta).
288. See Moore, 856 F.2d at 492.
289. See Ethan Lipsig, Are Plan Documents Still King? A Survey of Recent Unilateral
Contract and Inadequate Disclosure Fiduciary Breach Challenges to Plan Terms, 5 ERISA
LITIGATION RPTR. 21 (1996).
290. 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
291. See id. at 402.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 413.
294. See id. at 402.
295. See id. at 407 (Lively, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 413
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This assumption that the statutory requirement of a writing preempts
the need for integration analysis should be evaluated on several grounds.
First, the Joint Conference Report does not suggest that Congress intended
courts to presume that a plan document was integrated merely because it
was written down.296 In fact, it has long been apparent that the principles of
trust law and contract law must be applied to the interpretation of employee
plans.29 7 Integration analysis is no stranger to these disciplines, which have
often demanded that a writing be examined to determine if it is indeed a
true integration.29
Second, the fact that the written plan document rule is part of ERISA's
fiduciary provisions cannot be overlooked. Of course, ERISA cases have
long held that fiduciary standards provide no assistance to the employee in
matters of plan design are at issue.299 Although the employer is held to
fiduciary standards in administering the plan, he is not held to them in
establishing it.3°° Yet the written plan document rule becomes applicable
as a fiduciary standard once the plan is established. °1 It seems fair to
conclude that Congress, by expressing its desire for writings, was in fact
concerned that some promises would not be written down. If this is so, it is
logical to be concerned that what was in fact written down was an accurate
representation of the plan. A proper application of the parol evidence rule
would allow extrinsic evidence to determine whether that plan was in fact
correctly documented.
Again, the neutrality of this point must be stressed. In Moore, for
example, it is not self-evident that the result would have been different had
the court actually examined the evidence to determine whether they
properly represented an informal amendment to the plan.302 Indeed, the
court did give some consideration to the evidence that it found to be so
unworthy of its time and concluded that the filmstrips and presentations did
not "purport to be complete binding statements of plan terms. 303 There is
no reason to suspect that the outcome in Moore would have been different
had the court truly attempted to determine whether the plan documents
accurately reflected the terms of the plan. But in some cases, it might. If
Moore is followed, plaintiffs in such cases will find their accurate and
damaging evidence disregarded simply because the employer chose not to
(Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
296. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
297. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 121-51.
299. See, e.g., Bryant v. Food Lion, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D.S.C. 1991) (noting
that not every decision affecting a pension plan is subject to ERISA's fiduciary rules).
300. See id.
301. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (1lth Cir. 1982).
302. See Moore, 856 F.2d at 488.
303. See id. at 493.
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put it into a document that he drafted.
Moreover, it is evident that in at least one significant respect, courts
are uncomfortable with assuming that the plan document truly does
represent the entire contract. One recent manifestation of this discomfort is
the increasing tendency to incorporate summary plan descriptions into the
working notion of a plan document, despite their very different purposes.'04
In recent years, many circuit courts have stated that when the summary
plan description conflicts with the plan document, the plan document must
be disregarded.0 5 In Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,306 for example, the Sixth Circuit explained: "It is of no effect to
publish and distribute a plan summary booklet designed to simplify and
explain a voluminous and complex document and then proclaim that any
inconsistencies will be governed by the plan. Unfairness will flow to the
employee for reasonably relying on the summary booklet. '30 7  The
summary plan description, in most cases, is by definition merely a
description of the plan document.30 8 Yet, if representations in the summary
plan description can outweigh the clear terms of the plan document, clearly
the plan document is not necessarily integrated or, if the summary plan
description is published after the plan document itself is executed, it is
subject to some level of modification by the summary plan description.
2. Contract Interpretation
Even if the determination that a plan is fully integrated is explicitly
addressed, the issue of what to do with extrinsic evidence does not
disappear. Consider the case where plaintiff alleges that a plan promise has
not been fulfilled. Should extrinsic evidence be considered in determining
304. See ERISA § 402(a)(1). For requirements regarding summary plan descriptions,
see ERISA § 102(a)(1); ERISA § 104(b)(1); DOL Regulation § 2520.104b-l(a) (stating that
updated summary plan descriptions to be furnished every five years); DOL Regulation §
2520.104b-3(a).
305. See, e.g., Aiken v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4' Cir. 1993)
(holding that representations in the SPD control over inconsistent representations in the plan
document); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that
the summary plan document is binding). See generally Richard P. Carra & Christine L.
Thierfelder, Representations and Misrepresentations in Summary Plan Descriptions, 2
BENEFITS L.J. 179 (1989) (analyzing the legal consequences of inaccuracies in a summary
plan description). See, e.g., Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that representations in the SPD control over inconsistent representations in
the plan document); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the summary plan document is binding).
306. 851 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988).
307. Id. at 136 (quoting McKnight v. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566,
1570 (1 lth Cir. 1985)).
308. See ERISA § 102,29 U.S.C. § 1002; 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2.
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the existence of an ambiguity? How this question would be resolved under
ERISA depends on the court's willingness to consider a more expansive
role for extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation.
Collectively bargained plans offer a clear battleground for conflicts
over interpretation.3°9 In recent years, much judicial attention has been
lavished on the interpretation of provisions regarding the duration of retiree
health benefits.310 The Sixth Circuit addressed the classic question in UAW
Local No. 134 v. Yard-Man, 1 the first and most influential of these
decisions: in the absence of explicit vesting provisions, how is one to
determine whether retiree benefits are intended to vest and to endure
beyond the duration of the collective bargaining agreement? Yard-Man,
which proposed a default presumption in favor of vesting, answered the
question in one way.312 In the alternative, other courts have refused to infer
a presumption of vesting and have instead maintained that retiree status
cannot be deemed to confer lifetime benefits unless the plan document
suggests a basis for concluding that vesting was intended.313 The issue has
been addressed in most of the other circuits.314
These cases have been characterized in a number of different ways. In
one sense, following Yard-Man's lead, these cases raise the question of the
default assumption regarding the vesting of retiree benefits. Courts which
adopt this approach ask themselves whether they should presume, as a
starting point, that retiree benefits do or do not extend beyond retirement. 5
Judge Cudahy's concurring opinion in Bidlack offered six paradigms of
contractual interpretation that addressed this dilemma: (1) a strong
presumption against vesting the benefits would assume that silence on the
309. The precedent for the consideration of extrinsic evidence in collective bargaining
cases extends beyond the disputes over retiree medical benefits. In Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Brotherhood of Railway Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778
(3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit considered the role of extrinsic evidence in the
interpretation of a dispute under the Railway Labor Act. The court rejected the union's
contention that that the district court violated principles of contract interpretation and the
parties' agreed "zipper clause" when it considered extrinsic proof of the parties' intent
regarding the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 785. Citing Transportation-
Communications Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 385 U.S. 157 (1966), the
court stated that it was appropriate and proper to consider evidence "beyond the face of the
collective bargaining agreement" because such an agreement might include the parties'
practice, usage and custom and that such evidence could be considered without necessarily
varying the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, 882 F.2d at 784.
310. See UAW Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3d. Circuit 1999).
311. 716F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).
312. See id. at 1482.
313. See, e.g., Skinner, 188 F.3d at 139 (explaining circuit approbation and rejection of
Yard-Man inference).
314. See id.
315. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
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issue of vesting means no vesting; (2) a strong presumption in favor of
vesting the benefits would assume that silence on the issue of vesting
means vesting; (3) a weak presumption against vesting the benefits would
allow ambiguous language to be evaluated in light of extrinsic evidence;
(4) a weak presumption in favor of vesting; (5) a parol substitution rule
would permit the use of extrinsic evidence even when the collective
bargaining agreement is silent and would assume that any evidence means
no vesting; (6) a parol substitution rule permitting the use of extrinsic
evidence that assumes no evidence means vesting.
316
Judge Cudahy saw an approach that emphasized parol evidence as an
alternative to a presumption of vesting. He also found it easy, however, to
dismiss what he termed the "parol substitution" arguments on the grounds
that they dismissed the value of the written contract.317 If one assumes that
health benefits truly are discretionary benefits that are not mandated by
government fiat, though, a presumption for or against vesting is far more
troubling than a presumption that extrinsic evidence should be examined.
Whether or not one approves, the current system of providing health
insurance in the United States does not include a government mandate to
provide benefits.313 The creation of a judicial presumption for or against
the provision of these benefits tips the neutrality of the government toward
one party and away from the other.
The Yard-Man dilemma has forced courts to take a stand on whether a
presumption of vesting is appropriate or desirable. To the extent that courts
should be encouraged to articulate their unspoken assumptions in the
interest of clarity, it has doubtless served a useful, if limited, purpose.
Assume, however, that the Yard-Man inference is not adopted by a
circuit, as indeed it has not been in several jurisdictions. 3 9 Another way to
conceptualize the common themes of these opinions, then, is to ask whether
extrinsic evidence should be examined to determine whether the collective
bargaining agreement is ambiguous with respect to the duration of retiree
health benefits. In a system which allows employers and employees to
determine whether health benefits will be provided, without the
intervention of a governmental body, it makes far more sense to weigh
parol evidence to determine whether the parties did indeed agree to this
provision. Once the question of vesting is characterized in this manner, the
traditional tools of analysis, including the parol evidence rule, may be used
without the bias that can be introduced by judicial presumptions for or
against vesting.
316. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Co., 993 F.2d 603, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
317. Seeid. at611.
318. See id.
319. See Skinner, 188 F.3d at 139.
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Even if one accepts the premise that an analysis of a collective
bargaining agreement should proceed free from judicial presumptions
regarding the nature of vesting, serious differences of approach between the
circuits are evident in their approach to extrinsic evidence. Arguments
against the introduction of such evidence frequently recite the mantra that
extrinsic evidence may not be used to create an ambiguity.320 May it be
used, however, to demonstrate that an ambiguity is present? For some
courts, the clear answer is no. Consider, for example, the district court's
321opinion in Arndt v. Wheelabrator Corp., the case which ultimately gave
322
rise to the famous opinion in Bidlack. In Arndt, the United Auto
Workers, on behalf of production and maintenance employees, entered into
a series of collective bargaining agreements with Wheelabrator
Corporation.3z The collective bargaining agreements provided for retiree
health benefits, but did not expressly specify whether those benefits would
324
continue beyond the duration of the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiffs offered extrinsic evidence in the form of a variety of letters to
retirees and testimony of a union negotiator that suggested that the parties
had intended that retirees would continue to receive the same level of
benefits they did as active employees for the duration of their retirement*325
When Wheelabrator ultimately reduced the level of retiree benefits, the
company's retirees and their spouses brought a class action seeking a
restoration of benefits and damages for lost benefits and a variety of other
claims based on a breach of the LMRA (Labor Management Relations Act)
and ERISA. 26 The district court's opinion, which was later reversed by the
Seventh Circuit in Bidlack, illustrated a particularly strict approach to
extrinsic evidence that suggests a level of benefits more generous than the
benefits described in the plan document. Borrowing from Moore, the court
began with the precept that "an ERISA welfare plan that is unambiguous is
not subject to amendment by the informal communications between the
employer and the beneficiaries. 327  The court examined the plan
documents (including the collective bargaining agreement, insurance
policies, and a Master Operating Agreement) and concluded that there was
no intention on the employer's part to provide retirees with the same level
of benefits, at no cost, for life.328 Moreover, the court ruled that extrinsic
evidence of informal communications should play no part in this analysis
320. See, e.g., id. at 145.
321. 763 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
322. 993 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1993).
323. See Arndt, 763 F. Supp. at 398.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 400-01.
327. Id. at 405.
328. See id. at 406.
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because the plan documents were not ambiguous.329
Even when the extrinsic evidence strongly suggests that the plan
document is ambiguous, there is a deep-rooted reluctance to acknowledge
an ambiguity that is not patently obvious on the face of the document itself
still remains. In American Federation of Grain Millers v. International
Mult foods Corp.,33° for example, an employer continued to provide
benefits beyond the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The
plan document included a reservation of rights clause.33' The court held
that in order to show ambiguity in a collective bargaining agreement,
plaintiffs were obliged to point to some written language capable of
suggesting that a vested right exists.332 The court determined that the
ERISA plan document clearly reserved right to amend and, on the strength
of that provision, the plaintiffs could not admit extrinsic evidence to
demonstrate ambiguity in the collective bargaining agreement's approach to
vesting.333 Similarly, in Senn v. United Dominion Industries, Inc.,3 4 which
has been effectively overruled by Bidlack, the Seventh Circuit held that
extrinsic evidence was not admissible to demonstrate that retiree benefits
were vested, even when the plan document was silent with respect to this
issue.335 The plan's silence was thus construed as a clear directive that the
benefits were not vested.336 Even when extrinsic evidence was available to
show an argument to the contrary, the absence of any plan language that
suggested an ambiguity precluded the introduction of such evidence.337 In
other words, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to demonstrate the
existence of an ambiguity.
In contrast to Arndt and other more strict interpretations of the written
plan document rule, Judge Posner's lead opinion in Bidlack contemplated
the possibility that, in certain limited circumstances, extrinsic evidence
could be introduced to demonstrate that the language of the agreement was
ambiguous.338 Judge Posner envisioned at least three scenarios in which
consideration of extrinsic evidence would be appropriate: first, to
demonstrate that a written contract that appears to be clear is nonetheless
ambiguous; second, to demonstrate that a term in the contract is
329. See id.
330. 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997).
331. Seeid. at982.
332. See id. at 980.
333. See id. at 982.
334. 951 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992).
335. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Co., 993 F.2d 603, 610 (7th Cir. 1993), for Judge
Cudahy's description of the Senn opinion; see also Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301,
305 (7th Cir. 1996).
336. See Senn, 951 F.2d at 815.
337. See id.
338. See Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608.
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ambiguous; or, third, to clarify that there is "some yawning void... that
cries out for an implied term.
3 39
The dictum in Bidlack thus illustrates a perspective that is more
accepting of extrinsic evidence than the case itself or its progeny have
suggested.340 This approach to extrinsic evidence, which might be regarded
as permissive in comparison to the district court's holding in Arndt,
remained theoretical, as Judge Posner did not in fact find it necessary to
resort to extrinsic evidence in order to conclude that the contract was
ambiguous. Thus, there is nothing novel about Judge Posner's treatment of
extrinsic evidence in the actual workings of this opinion: he examines the
"language and logic" of the agreement, concludes that it is ambiguous, and
rules that the parties should be able "to present testimony and documents
that they claim will disambiguate it."341 Judge Posner's endorsement of the
use of extrinsic evidence is limited by the precept that extrinsic evidence
should not be used to add terms to a contract that is plausibly complete
without them.342 Thus, the language of the agreement must be examined to
determine whether an ambiguity is present. In fact, Judge Posner
concludes that extrinsic evidence should not be admitted to determine
whether benefits are vested when a contract is silent on the duration of
health benefits and is not structured in a way that would require the
perpetual duration of such benefits. 34' Thus, most cases focus on
contractual language in their analysis to determine whether an ambiguity
exists, without referring to extrinsic evidence. Indeed, in Pabst Brewing
Company, the court noted that decisions that have been handed down since
Bidlack clearly focus on the importance of contractual language.
44
In some cases, courts have expressed a willingness to entertain
extrinsic evidence under limited circumstances. Several cases arising from
disputes over contributions to multi-employer pension funds address this
issue. In AM International, Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates,
Inc.,34' for example, the Seventh Circuit reminded litigants that in the
tradition of Raffles v. Wichelhaus,346 extrinsic evidence was admissible to
demonstrate that the meaning of a contract that appeared clear on its face
was not always unambiguous. In Central States, Southeast & Sourthwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Company, Judge Flaum's
339. Id.; see also Pabst Brewing Co., Inc. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 440 (71 Cir. 1998).
340. See generally Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Cartage Co., 69 F.3d 1312, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1995) (Flaum, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Bidlack opinion actually adopts a contract law approach to ambiguity).
341. Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609.
342. See id. at 608.
343. See id.
344. See Pabst Brewing Co., 161 F.3d at 440.
345. 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
346. 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
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concurrence noted that parties may attach an idiosyncratic meaning to a
term that might appear plain to people who were not familiar with such a
meaning.347 The consideration of objective extrinsic evidence is the only
means that would enable a court to accurately interpret such a contract.
While Judge Flaum is at pains to distinguish the facts that would evoke the
necessity of using this principle from arguments based on flaws in the
contract formation process,34s it is clear that under the proper circumstances
he would indeed be willing to entertain extrinsic evidence to aid in
determining whether certain contractual language was ambiguous.349
In using extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether an
ambiguity exists, a court need not necessarily venture into unfamiliar
territory. Sometimes the sources of extrinsic inspiration are close at hand.
In Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc.,35° for example, Judge Mansmann
of the Third Circuit turned to her dictionary, to empirical research, and to
an analysis of the defendants' past practices in order to conclude that a
reservation of rights clause was ambiguous. 35' These sources - extrinsic to
the summary plan descriptions that she was examining - suggest a
conscious effort to overcome her own sense of the meaning of the
language, an endeavor reminiscent of the Third Circuit's admonition in
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. for judges to be sensitive
to the dangers of imposing their own linguistic experience on the
interpretation of contracts.352 Indeed, Judge Mansmann's opinion expressly
considered the possibility that a lawyer and a plan participant might attach
different meanings to the same words.353 Another Third Circuit opinion,
Smith v. Hartford Insurance Group, 54 held that it was appropriate to
examine evidence of the parties' performance in order to demonstrate a
latent ambiguity in the contract.355 In that case, extrinsic evidence was
admissible in order to determine whether the parties' use of the word
"employ" in the summary plan description was ambiguous.356
The main objection that is levied against the consideration of extrinsic
347. See 69 F.3d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1995).
348. See id. Judge Flaum distinguishes the facts in Central Cartage Company from the
case of Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F.3d 1184 (7th Cir. 1994).
349. See Central Cartage Co., 69 F.3d at 1318-19.
350. 967 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
351. See id. at 92-93 (presenting Webster's Dictionary's definition of various terms to
show that they are susceptible to different interpretations, and referring to the results of
empirical research which suggested that readers could conclude that clause vested benefits
for life).
352. See 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980), cited in Alexander, 967 F.2d at 95 n. 1.
353. See Alexander, 967 F.2d at 94.
354. 6 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1993).
355. See id. at 138.
356. See id.
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evidence is that it devalues the written document.357 A written document
that is accurate, however, has nothing to fear from parol evidence. The
court in Skinner Engine Co., for example, specifically considered
deposition testimony of union officials regarding past practices and other
extrinsic sources and concluded that the extrinsic evidence failed to
demonstrate that an ambiguity existed in the collective bargaining
agreement.358 On the other hand, a written document that is inaccurate
should be subject to severe scrutiny.
A recent decision from the Third Circuit offers a clear illustration of
this point. In In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA"
Litigation,359 the Third Circuit performed a traditional examination of the
language of an ERISA plan and concluded that the fact that it contained
both a reservation of rights clause and a promise of lifetime benefits did not
render the plan language ambiguous as a matter of law.36° The Third
Circuit did not find it necessary to use extrinsic evidence to reach its
determination and, in fact, its holding on this point was consistent with the
lower court's ruling.36' This opinion is unusual, however, in that despite its
finding that the plan language unambiguously reserved the right to amend
the plan, the district court had nonetheless performed an analysis of
extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether the reservation of rights
362clause applied to the promise of lifetime benefits. The analysis of the
extrinsic evidence in the case led the district to conclude that the benefits
were not vested, and the Third Circuit did not find clear error in the
analysis of the extrinsic evidence. 363 Thus, while it would be a mistake to
construe In re Unisys as supporting the use of extrinsic evidence to
determine the presence of an ambiguity, it does offer an illustration of the
hypothesis that extrinsic evidence will not always work to the disadvantage
of a properly drafted document.
It is true that employees have much to gain by obtaining the
opportunity to put forward extrinsic evidence of this nature. Although a
court may examine extrinsic evidence regarding the promises that have
been made, a court is not forced to conclude that the evidence is credible.
Ignoring the evidence does, however, insure that no matter how credible or
secure its substance might be, it will not play a part in the ultimate
resolution of the issue at hand.
357. See generally Jenson V. Sipco, Eighth Circuit Opens the Door to Extrinsic Evidence
in All Retiree Health Cases, 3 ERISA LrTGATION REP. 13, 18 (1995).
358. See UAW Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 145 (3d Cir. 1999).
359. 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).
360. See id. at 903-04.
361. See id. at 904.
362. See id.
363. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The use of extrinsic evidence for the purposes of determining whether
a plan document is properly integrated and for determining whether an
ambiguity exists will not correct all of the evils that have befallen ERISA
participants. Nor, however, will it vastly disadvantage employers. In the
final analysis, the operation of this rule will do what the parol evidence rule
was always intended to do: distinguish between writings that deserve the
highest form of protection and those that do not. Surely this cannot be an
unmeritorious goal in the interpretation of a statute which was intended to
protect plan participants and the promises of benefits that were made to
them.
